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Preface
IN 2020, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland commissioned a development 
policy related study on Africa’s connec-
tivity.
Development policy related studies 
are not academic research as such. The 
authors are academically qualified re-
searchers, however, and they base their 
findings on academic studies. The Mi-
nistry for Foreign Affairs chooses aut-
hors through a call for proposals orga-
nized by UniPID, the Finnish University 
Partnership for International Develop-
ment, of the University of Jyväskylä.
The group of researchers chosen to 
author the current report consisted of 
Ms. Eva Nilsson, PhD candidate at the 
Hanken School of Economics, Dr. Obert 
Hodzi at the University of Liverpool, Ms. 
Neema Komba, PhD candidate at the 
Hanken School of Economics, Professor 
Erkki Sutinen at the University of Turku, 
Dr. Mika Kautonen at Tampere University 
and Dr. Liisa Laakso at the Nordic Africa 
Institute.
The report focuses on Africa’s connec-
tivity in the sectors of energy, transport, 
digitalization and research & innovation. 
Each chapter includes a summary, an 
overview of the sector, an overview of the 
policy and investment environment, and 
recommendations for Finland and the EU.
These types of reports have an impor-
tant role in strengthening evidence-ba-
sed decision-making. Last year the Mi-
nistry for Foreign Affairs published two 
reports on Africa that sparked a lot of 
interest in the wider public as well. The 
first deals with political and economic 
integration in Africa, and the second dis-
cusses megatrends in Africa. Similarly to 
them, the Ministry decided to publish on-
line the current report, Connecting Africa 
- Perspectives for Digitalization, Energy, 
Transport and Research & Innovation.
The current Covid-19 pandemic crisis 
highlights the importance of connecting 
Africa.
On behalf of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, I would like to thank the research 
team and UniPID for an excellent report 
and commendable cooperation. I hope 
that this publication on Africa’s connec-
tivity finds its way into the hands of an 
interested readership that can put it to 
good use.
    
 
At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs  
on 24 July 2020
Martti Eirola
Senior Adviser on Africa Policy

Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................4
References .............................................................................................................9
ENERGY CONNECTIVITY .................................................................................10
Summary ...............................................................................................................11
Current understanding of energy connectivity in Africa ........................................12
Policy and investment environment of energy connectivity ..................................17
Recommendations for Finland and the EU for supporting sustainable 
energy connectivity ...............................................................................................20
References .............................................................................................................22
TRANSPORT CONNECTIVITY ...........................................................................24
Summary ...............................................................................................................25
Current understanding of transport connectivity in Africa ....................................26
Road transport ...................................................................................................28
Rail transport .....................................................................................................29
Air transport ......................................................................................................30
Sea transport .....................................................................................................32
The policy and investment environment of transport connectivity .......................36
Recommendations for Finland and the EU related to supporting 
transport connectivity ...........................................................................................38
References .............................................................................................................40
DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY .................................................................................42
Summary ...............................................................................................................43
Current understanding of digital connectivity in Africa ........................................44
The policy and investment environment of digital connectivity ............................49
Recommendations for Finland and the EU related to supporting 
digital connectivity ...............................................................................................52
References .............................................................................................................56
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION CONNECTIVITY ..................................................58
Summary ...............................................................................................................59
Current understanding of research and innovation connectivity in Africa ............60
Higher education ...............................................................................................61
Research and innovation ....................................................................................63
Policy and investment environment of research and innovation connectivity ......66
Recommendations for Finland and the EU to support research and 
innovation connectivity .........................................................................................68
References .............................................................................................................70
Concluding words .........................................................................................72
The Covid-19 pandemic and connectivity ..............................................................74
References .............................................................................................................75
Author Bios ..................................................................................................76
CONNECTING AFRICA – INTRODUCTION4
THIS STUDY ANALYSES the potential of 
improving connectivity, both in Africa 
and between Africa and Europe. As so-
cieties across the globe depend on flows 
of goods, services, people and capital, 
networks that enable these flows – tran-
sport, logistics, communications, and 
electricity networks – have become cru-
cial for the global economy and an essen-
tial part of world politics. In addition to 
physical infrastructure, regulatory fra-
meworks, standards and policies related 
to connectivity are constantly in the ma-
king in all parts of the world, including 
Africa. 
In social science research, conne-
ctivity has become synonymous with 
networks and a common proxy for 
measuring the intensity of globalisation. 
Broadly, connectivity describes how dif-
ferent nodes – such as cities, ports and 
people – are networked physically and 
virtually (Castells, 2010). Connectivity 
can be ‘formal’ or ‘informal’, the latter 
encompassing common activities in the 
informal sector and illegal forms of con-
nectivity, such as illicit financial flows 
or drug trade (e.g. the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD], 2018). Connectivity, except in 
its illegal and illicit forms, potentially 
fosters integration, peace and prosperity. 
Connectivity has become a common 
concept in world politics, especially in 
relation to Chinese foreign policy and 
1  The fourth industrial revolution refers to technology-driven change in which new digital technologies, such as artificial intelligence, become embedded within 
societies and create entirely new capabilities for people and machines.
its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Eu-
rope and Asia have agreed on a common 
understanding of connectivity which 
emphasises mutual interests in bringing 
countries, people and societies closer 
while narrowing varying gaps in levels of 
access, development and capacities. In 
Europe–Asia engagement, the principles 
of free and open trade, free markets, in-
clusiveness, fairness, transparency, fi-
nancial viability, cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability underpin connectivity 
(ASEM, 2017).
In this study, we seek to unders-
tand how connectivity within Africa and 
between Africa and the rest of the world 
has progressed and how it can further 
improve in an environmentally, economi-
cally, fiscally and socially just and sus-
tainable manner. No region can improve 
its connectivity alone – connectivity en-
capsulates cooperation and mutual ef-
fort, thus, we provide recommendations 
regarding the role that Finland and Eu-
rope can play alongside African countries 
to enhance their connectivity. We focus 
on connectivity in the sectors of energy, 
transport, digitalization, and research 
and innovation. Our underlying assump-
tion is that greater connectivity is a pre-
requisite for enhancing Africa’s role in 
the fourth industrial revolution,1 as well 
as leading to economic development and 
prosperity on the continent. 
The levels of connectivity in Africa 
vary. Although some areas – mostly ci-
ties such as Johannesburg, Lagos and 
Mombasa – are globally connected, the 
overall picture is that, based on global 
measures, connectivity in sub-Saharan 
Africa is still low. As the African popu-
lation is growing quickly, the need for 
investments to improve connectivity 
is even more pressing. However, as it 
stands, current investment levels lag be-
hind population growth. Because of that, 
for instance, even though internet speed 
has increased and the cost of access to 
the internet has decreased, the propor-
tion of people connected to a fixed broad-
band connection has decreased in Africa. 
Only about 40 per cent of the population 
in Africa have access to 4G networks, and 
the mobile internet penetration was, as 
of 2018, merely 24 per cent. However, 
while mobile subscriptions are showing 
a stabilising trend, fixed connections are 
on the increase. Undersea cable connec-
tions are developing fast and terrestrial 
cables connect countries to each other 
better. 
Essential to enhancing connectivity 
is energy supply. In Africa, per capita 
electricity consumption is rising by 4–6 
per cent annually. However, 645 million 
people still lack access to electricity, and 
80 per cent rely on fuelwood and charcoal 
for domestic heating and cooking. The 
implication is that Africa is behind other 
Introduction
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regions and, by 2040, an estimated 90 
per cent of the global population without 
access to electricity will be concentrated 
in sub-Saharan Africa (IEA, 2019). Based 
on the current levels, it will take sub-Sa-
haran Africa until 2080 for its entire 
population to have universal access – it 
would mean considerable investments in 
energy infrastructure (of about US$43–
55 billion annually) to reach universal 
access by 2040 (UNEP, 2017). Currently, 
Africa relies heavily on fossil fuels for 
its energy needs. However, a push to in-
crease Africa’s energy connectivity offers 
great potential to transform the conti-
nent’s countries into low-carbon econo-
mies.
Transport infrastructure is crucial to 
realising regional integration and the 
meaningful engagement of Africa within 
the global production chain. Despite sig-
nificant investments in road infrastruc-
ture, more than half of Africa’s roads are 
unpaved and less than half of the rural 
population has access to an all-seasons 
road. In addition, the rail network is eit-
her dilapidated or non-existent while Af-
rica’s air transport industry is the smal-
lest in the world. The effects of COVID-19 
have extinguished prospects of growth 
in the aviation industry, as had been 
projected by PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Furthermore, reflecting its participa-
tion level in the global production and 
supply chains, Africa has a two per cent 
share of the global container port traffic. 
Nonetheless, growth in trade relations 
with China has led to the construction 
and refurbishment of port facilities in 
Djibouti, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and 
other regions – significantly connecting 
Africa with its commodities markets in 
China and, to a lesser extent, India. In 
sum, Africa’s transport connectivity re-
mains challenging due to the lack of inf-
rastructure, and adequately harmonised 
and standardised transport policies and 
regulations. 
Against this picture, Africa’s gross 
expenditure on research and develop-
ment (R&D) as a proportion of Gross 
2  Calculations about the financing gap vary. The Infrastructure Consortium of Africa has estimated the gap to in the USD 53–93 billion range and the Brookings 
Institution has pointed to research that argues that, if public spending on infrastructure was managed better and accompanied by policy and institutional reforms, 
the financing needs would drop significantly (Devarajan, Gill, & Karakulah, 2019).
Domestic Product (GDP) stands at only 
about 0.5 per cent compared with the 
world average of 2.2 per cent. Fortuna-
tely, the number of higher education 
institutions (HEIs) has grown rapidly. 
However, the quality of higher education 
has not grown in the same pace. The 
student-to-teacher ratio, research capa-
city and basic infrastructure are serious 
concerns all over the continent. While 
there are a number of graduates from 
HEIs that become unemployed, there are 
shortages of skilled labour in the fields 
of engineering, science, agriculture and 
health in particular. 
A positive trend is that there has been 
a boom of the start-up culture in several 
entrepreneurial and innovative hotspots 
in Africa. In 2010, there were altogether 
only about USD 20 million venture ca-
pital (VC) investments to Africa – nine 
years later the estimation is that this 
figure will be as high as USD 1.5 billion. 
In parallel, there has been a boom of 
innovation hubs. For these, affordable 
shared office space, fast internet conne-
ctions and reliable electricity, which are 
still in short supply in Africa, are crucial. 
The pressure to develop the infra-
structure essential to enhancing Africa’s 
connectivity has resulted in some Afri-
can countries being heavily indebted. 
African governments have financed over 
40 per cent of their own infrastructure 
needs. They have contracted debt from 
international debt markets (in particu-
lar, Eurobond issuance), domestic mar-
kets, multilateral institutions and va-
rious countries. According to the World 
Bank’s Global Economic Prospects, the 
average debt-to-GDP ratio in Africa was 
61.3 per cent as of 2019. Even with these 
huge debt burdens, the continent’s inf-
rastructure financing gap is approxima-
tely US$68–108 billion annually2 (ICA, 
2017). The huge infrastructure gap in the 
continent means that support from exter-
nal partners such as the Infrastructure 
We focus on connectivity in the 
sectors of transport, energy, 
digitalisation, and research 
and innovation. Our under-
lying assumption is that greater 
connectivity is a prerequisite for 
enhancing Africa’s role in the fourth 
industrial revolution, as well as 
leading to economic development 
and prosperity on the continent. 
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Consortium for Africa members3 is im-
perative. For example, in 2019, exter-
nal partners funded 22.8 per cent of the 
projects, while most of government-fun-
ded projects in Africa relate to transport 
(55.3%) and energy (20.4%) (Deloitte, 
2019, p. 6). In addition, emerging infra-
structure development partners, such as 
China and India, have increasingly pro-
vided considerable alternative financing 
for Africa’s infrastructure development. 
In particular, China has been Africa’s 
major bilateral lender, external funder 
and constructor of key infrastructure 
(such as railways, roads, power plants 
and ports) in Africa (Coulibaly, Gandhi, 
3  Infrastructure Consortium for Africa members include: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, South Africa, the AfDB, the EC, the European 
Investment Bank, the European Union and the World Bank Group.
& Senbet, 2019). In 2018, China com-
mitted US$25.7 billion, which constitutes 
26 per cent of the total of US$100.8 bil-
lion committed to Africa’s infrastructure 
programmes in 2018. Although this is 
welcome, there are growing concerns over 
the increased indebtedness of some Afri-
can countries and their over-dependence 
on China. Already, Kenya and Ethiopia 
have had to request rescheduling of their 
loans from China. Kenya got Chinese 
loans to fund the Mombasa–Nairobi Stan-
dard Gauge Railway, which cost appro-
ximately US$3.3 billion, while Ethiopia 
got US$4.3 billion for the Addis Ababa 
Railway. According to media reports, the 
Chinese embassy in Ethiopia posted on 
its website in July 2018 that ‘the intensi-
fying repayment risks from the Ethiopian 
government’s debt reaching 59 percent of 
GDP is worrying investors’. Angola owes 
China about US$21.5 billion, which is half 
of its external debt. Djibouti owes 59 per 
cent of its external debt to China. As a 
result, US senators warned that African 
countries, such as Djibouti and Zambia, 
risk losing strategic national assets to 
China over such un-serviced loans. Alt-
hough, there is little evidence to suggest 
that it would be the case, this is a wor-
rying concern. 
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In response to the debt-trap allega-
tions, China announced that it would ad-
just its overseas development lending in 
order that will be more sustainable. Howe-
ver, at the core of this crisis of bilateral 
debt in Africa is the absence of standard 
lending practices, particularly between 
OECD countries and emerging actors like 
China. Trilateral cooperation between, for 
instance, the European Union (EU), China 
and Africa may go a long way in creating 
uniform working conditions.
Although, both the traditional and 
emerging development partners agree 
on the need to enhance Africa’s conne-
ctivity, their motivations and strategies 
for achieving that connectivity vary. The 
World Bank (2019) noted that ‘while there 
is little controversy over the resources 
that need to be invested in connectivity, 
there are varying expectations of what 
connectivity is intended to achieve’. This 
is partly because connectivity ‘influen-
ces the distribution of power between 
the connected parties, be it regions, ci-
ties, firms or communities’ (World Bank, 
2019). The African Union (AU) regards 
connectivity as essential to continental 
political and economic integration, and a 
necessary step to enhancing Africa’s role 
in global governance. On the other hand, 
China’s BRI aims at enhancing China’s 
connection with the rest of the world – 
to its advantage. Thus, geopolitical and 
strategic considerations within Africa 
and between Africa’s external partners 
often underpin connectivity in Africa. 
Within Africa, geopolitical conside-
rations also affect integration and con-
nectivity between countries. Support for 
continental and regional projects seems 
to be dependent on national interests. 
FIGURE 1: REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY THE AU 2012–2019.
ECCAS=Economic Community of Central African States, COMESA=Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, EAC=East African Community, ECO-
WAS=Economic Community of West African States, IGAD=Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development, SADC=Southern African Development Community, 
AMU/UMA=Arab Maghreb Union
SOURCE: AU-PIDA (2019). 
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Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which 
will be the largest hydroelectric dam in 
Africa, have stalled due to disputes with 
Egypt. 
At the continental level, the AU is 
committed to improving connectivity as 
espoused in Agenda 2063 and through 
the Programme for Infrastructure Deve-
lopment of Africa (PIDA). PIDA is focu-
sed on improving African infrastructure 
and improving regional interconnecti-
vity. In addition, the African Develop-
ment Bank (AfDB) is hosting the Inf-
rastructure Investment Consortium, 
which aims to coordinate efforts made 
towards improving infrastructure in Af-
rica, and the AFRICA50 investment fund. 
AFRICA50 funds national and regional 
projects, mostly energy and transport 
projects. On the sub-regional level, Af-
rica’s Regional Economic Communities 
(RECs) have some parts of key regional 
transport and energy corridors missing, 
Failures to agree on funding and imple-
mentation mechanisms also derail criti-
cal infrastructure projects, particularly 
the Trans-African Highway network, a 
network of transcontinental highway inf-
rastructure development projects conne-
cting African cities, which still has mis-
sing links. In addition, despite Africa’s 
energy needs, projects such as Ethiopia’s 
Within Africa, geopolitical consid-
erations also affect integration and 
connectivity between countries.
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hence cross-border energy trade is still 
very limited. In addition, there are a lack 
of policies that aim to increase regional 
connectivity and remove obstacles (such 
as visa restrictions) in order to enable 
unhindered cross-border movements by 
people and goods. Largely, the harmoni-
sation of policies might remain unresol-
ved because the membership of most 
RECs, especially the Economic Commu-
nity of Central African States (ECCAS), 
comprise of low-income and middle-in-
come countries, as well as fragile states 
and landlocked states – hence they face 
challenges in accommodating the inte-
rests of all parties. 
Of all the continents, Africa will pro-
bably be the one that is most affected 
by climate change. Already, floods and 
droughts have left millions of Africans in 
financial and food distress. That means 
transport, energy and digital infrastruc-
ture development projects require consi-
derable environmental assessment. This 
has been a challenge for African states. 
Environmental and climate change con-
sideration have often come second. For 
instance, in Kenya, environmentalists 
have denounced the Mombasa-Nairobi 
railway for endangering wildlife and their 
natural habitat. In addition, to meet its 
energy needs, some African countries re-
main focused on fossil fuels, with limited 
transition to sustainable renewable 
energy (such as solar, wind, thermal 
and small hydro energy). Ethiopia is a 
leading example of a country harnessing 
wind energy to meet its energy needs. 
Large hydro dams, prioritised across Af-
rica as a source of electrification, have 
proven to have massive negative environ-
mental and social impacts. As a result, 
due to limited sources of energy, Africa 
lags behind the global move toward ele-
ctric vehicles. 
The business environment in Africa 
is among the world’s most cumbersome. 
Among the bottom 20 economies rated 
according to the ease of doing business, 
12 are in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 
2020). The investment and business en-
vironment related to connectivity varies 
from country to country and region to 
region. Renewable energy markets have, 
for example, been open to foreign inves-
tors in Kenya whereas some countries, 
such as Ghana, have long-term power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) with fos-
sil fuel–based independent power pro-
ducers. The bidding process of many inf-
rastructure projects is less competitive 
and, according to some analysts, favour 
Chinese firms (Dezenski, 2020). State of-
ficials partly influence the projects from 
their inception stage. Thus, according to 
European International Contractors, Chi-
nese firms undercut their competition by 
at least 20 per cent. They are able to do 
so because they get subsidies from the 
Chinese government and considerable 
preferential treatment from African go-
vernments who are keen on maintaining 
cordial bilateral relations with China. 
Furthermore, most of the loans from 
China have economic conditions tied 
to them – especially that the materials 
should be procured in China. Some of the 
loan conditions attached to Chinese loans 
are secretive, thus making it even more 
difficult for open competitive bidding for 
projects. Beyond the construction of new 
infrastructure, the focus should also be 
on the maintenance of the existing infra-
structure. For that, Africa has to improve 
its tax revenues, increase foreign equity 
investments and improve the sustaina-
bility of existing infrastructure. This will 
reduce the dependence of Africa on bila-
teral debt from gigantic projects that are 
unprofitable.
Improved connectivity could have 
huge development impacts. Access to 
reliable electricity would change the 
lives of more than 600 million people 
who currently lack such access. Better 
transport infrastructure could improve 
intra-African trade and lead to domestic 
manufacturing and more diversified eco-
nomies. The further development of di-
gital services that also serve low-income 
earners could have immense impacts on 
financial inclusion, access to electricity 
and access to markets, to name but a few 
impacts. A more connected research and 
education sector would increase people-
to-people exchanges of knowledge and 
assist mutual learning, equality and par-
tnership building.
Improved connectivity could have 
huge development impacts. 
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CONNECTIVITY
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THIS CHAPTER DESCRIBES how energy in 
Africa is generated and how people have 
access to energy and electricity. It anal-
yses the possibilities for African coun-
tries to transform to zero-carbon econ-
omies and to reach universal access to 
electricity. 
Africa is rich in energy sources but 
faces an energy crisis. It produces about 
nine per cent of the world’s oil, six per 
cent of the world’s natural gas and four 
per cent of the world’s coal. It also pro-
duces about 18 per cent of the world’s 
uranium for nuclear power. One country, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
provides more than 70 per cent of the 
world’s cobalt for batteries in electronic 
appliances that are needed for a green 
energy transition.
While Africa is an important exporter 
to global energy markets, approximately 
half of the population in sub-Saharan 
Africa still lack access to electricity and 
more than 80 per cent of the popula-
tion rely on traditional uses of biomass, 
mainly fuelwood and charcoal, for cook-
ing. Businesses and households that are 
connected to the grid suffer from its un-
reliability and regular power cuts. 
In all of Africa, fossil energy is by far 
the largest source for electricity gener-
ation and large hydro and natural gas 
have had most growth in the past years. 
Despite its huge potential, renewable en-
ergy only covers slightly over 20 per cent 
of the total electricity generation capac-
ity. However, investment into renewable 
energy is growing fast, especially into 
solar photovoltaic (PV) energy. Small-
scale and off-grid solar solutions have 
increased rapidly in East Africa and are 
now expanding to West Africa, with pri-
vate investors playing a pivotal role. Most 
of the continent’s renewable energy in-
vestments take place in South Africa. In 
addition, Kenya is among the forerunners 
in having both large-scale and small-
scale renewable energy that powers the 
grid and off-grid areas.
African countries are the main inves-
tors in their own infrastructure. The in-
vestments are normally financed by loans 
and, in past years, especially China has 
emerged as a key lender to African energy 
infrastructure markets. In addition, other 
foreign actors – such as the US and mul-
tilateral institutions like the African De-
velopment Bank (AfDB), the World Bank 
and the EU – have increased their efforts 
in building energy infrastructure and 
reaching universal access to electricity. 
China operates in many large hydropower 
projects, the US prioritises natural gas 
and the EU emphasises renewable energy. 
Summary
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Current 
understanding of 
energy connectivity 
in Africa
THERE ARE LARGE variations in access to 
electricity across the African continent, 
between countries and between urban 
and rural areas. North African countries 
have achieved universal access to elec-
tricity and non-solid cooking fuel. South 
Africa is the only country in sub-Saharan 
Africa with rates close to those in North 
Africa. The lowest levels of access are in 
rural communities in the Central African 
region (6%) and several countries across 
the continent, such as Zambia, Soma-
lia and Liberia, have a rural access rate 
below five per cent (International Energy 
Agency [IEA], 2019b). 
In sub-Saharan Africa, more than 645 
million people lack access to electricity 
and more than 80 per cent of the popu-
lation rely on traditional uses of biomass 
(mainly fuelwood and charcoal) for cook-
ing, drying and heating (IEA, 2019b). 
The average electricity consumption rate 
of sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South 
Africa, is only about 150 KWh/capita 
per year compared to a global average 
of 7,000 KWh. Power is inaccessible, un-
affordable and unreliable for most peo-
ple. Only 34 per cent of hospitals have 
reliable electricity access and about 
58 per cent of health facilities have no 
electricity at all. Human muscle power is 
the major energy source for agriculture 
(UNEP, 2017). On average, only 26 per 
cent of rural communities have access 
to electricity, while the respective per-
centage for urban communities is above 
70 per cent (IEA, 2019). Worst off are 
women living in rural areas as they are 
usually the ones who provide households 
with energy through gathering fuelwood 
or paying for energy for cooking, lighting 
and heating. The poorest households are 
estimated to spend USD 10 billion annu-
ally on charcoal, candles, firewood and 
kerosene (UNEP, 2017). In addition, the 
fuelwood or charcoal used for cooking is 
unsafe and polluting, and has significant 
health effects, especially on women. Each 
year approximately 600,000 Africans die 
of household air pollution (UNEP, 2017). 
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According to estimates, 90 per cent 
of the global population without access 
to electricity will be concentrated in 
 sub-Saharan Africa by 2040 (IEA, 2019), 
and it will take until 2080 before full ac-
cess is reached at the current pace (UNEP, 
2017). Solving the energy crises there-
fore requires considerable investments 
in energy infrastructure. Despite some 
progress made, current and planned 
efforts to provide access to energy ser-
vices barely outpace the fast population 
growth on the continent. Reaching uni-
versal electricity access by 2040 would 
require tripling the average number of 
people gaining access every year from 
around 20 million today to over 60 mil-
lion people. Against the current $8–9.2 
billion, an estimated US$43–55 billion is 
needed annually in new investment until 
2030–2040 in order to meet the total 
investment needs in the energy sector 
(UNEP, 2017). The IEA estimates that 
grid extension and densification would 
be the least costly option for nearly 45 
per cent of the population gaining access 
by 2030, mini-grids for 30 per cent and 
stand-alone home systems for about 25 
per cent (IEA, 2019a). 
Where grid power is accessible, it is 
often unreliable. More than 30 coun-
tries in sub-Saharan Africa experience 
regular power shortages. Installed grid-
based capacity is around 90 GW and, at 
any one time, as much as one quarter of 
that capacity is not operational (UNEP, 
2017). Electricity is cut about six times 
per month for about 5.5 hours at a time 
(Trimble et al., 2016). These shortages 
could cost African economies 2–4 per 
cent of GDP annually and more than 70 
per cent of businesses in sub-Saharan Af-
rica identify unreliable power as a major 
constraint for growth (APP, 2015; AfDB, 
2015). Due to unreliable electricity, busi-
nesses and well-off households own die-
sel fuel–powered generators. Paying for 
generator power is a necessary cost of 
doing business in any sector, ranging 
from heavy industries to banks and mo-
bile-phone companies. Of the businesses 
in Kenya and Tanzania, 57 and 42 per 
cent respectively own their own genera-
tions. On average, generator power is at 
least four times the price of grid power. 
Because of large energy costs, African 
markets are uncompetitive with many 
businesses that operate in other parts of 
the world (McKinsey & Company, 2015). 
Research also shows that where grid 
power is accessible, many low-income 
households still cannot afford to be con-
nected and pay for electricity. Because 
of this, millions of people in Africa are 
living ‘under the grid’, meaning that they 
could be connected to the main grid but 
they are not. Only considering Nigeria, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana and Liberia, 95 
million people are estimated to live in 
under-the-grid areas (Leo et al., 2014). 
Research shows that reasons behind 
this are that connection charges are too 
high, the connection process is long and 
complicated, poor households have too 
low-income levels to afford meaningful 
electricity consumption, income flows 
are irregular, housing quality is poor 
and the electricity service is unreliable 
(Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019). Con-
necting people living under the grid 
would be a low-hanging fruit in regard to 
reaching universal energy access.
Where grid 
power is acces-
sible, it is often 
unreliable.
A shop called Off-grid electric near Arusha, Tanzania.
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FIGURE 1:  
ACCESS TO ELECTRICITY  
(% OF POPULATION) 2018  
SOURCE: WORLD BANK, SUSTAINABLE 
ENERGY FOR ALL (SE4ALL) DATABASE.
Africa’s per capita energy consumption 
is rising. A significant factor behind the 
rise of energy consumption is Africa’s 
rapid population growth coupled with 
rapid urbanisation. Residential demand 
is growing at a 5.6 per cent annual rate 
and industrial demand is growing at a 4.1 
per cent annual rate (McKinsey & Com-
pany, 2015). Fossil energy is by far the 
largest source for electricity generation 
(AFREC, 2019). There is steady invest-
ment into numerous gas, coal and large 
hydro projects that are being planned 
across the continent, and large hydro and 
gas have seen the most growth in recent 
years (BNEF, 2020). Within the past dec-
ade, large liquefied natural gas discov-
eries have been made, for example, in 
Mozambique, Tanzania and Ghana. Coal 
is heavily present in South Africa, but 
recently, new plants have been opened 
in Niger and Senegal. Renewable sources 
account for about 23 per cent of total in-
stalled electricity capacity (Res4Africa, 
2018). Calculations about the share of 
renewable energy vary depending on 
whether large hydro projects are included 
or not.
Political will for large hydropower 
seems evident despite rises in hydro-
power prices compared to solar and 
wind energy. The AU’s Programme for 
Infrastructure Development in Africa 
has identified several dams as priority 
projects for increasing continental con-
nectivity, of which some are underway 
and others are being planned. In addi-
tion, the AU’s Agenda 2063 identified the 
Grand Inga Dam project on the Congo 
River as one of its high priorities. This 
dam, if realised, will be the world’s larg-
est hydro power plant.
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According to research, a 100 per cent re-
newable energy system is technically and 
economically a possible and practical 
solution for sub-Saharan Africa to meet 
its energy demands (Barasa et al., 2018). 
Despite the large potential of renewable 
energy – almost unlimited solar sources 
(10 TW), abundant hydro sources (350 
GW), wind sources (110 GW) and geother-
mal energy sources (15 GW) – the use of 
renewable energy other than traditional 
biomass is still quite limited. In compar-
ison to other emerging markets, sub-Sa-
haran Africa has low levels of renewable 
energy capacity and commissioning and 
operating renewable energy is still more 
costly in Africa than the global average. 
Some reasons behind this are a lack of 
enabling environments, political will, 
currency and default risk, and a lack of 
access to finance. 
However, renewable energy capacity 
is increasing fast. Currently, South Af-
rica is attracting over 60 per cent of the 
renewable energy investments coming to 
sub-Saharan Africa, but the trajectory is 
also upward in other countries in sub-Sa-
haran Africa (BNEF, 2020). Out of the 
different sources of renewable energy, 
solar and wind energy have the most 
potential due to their constantly falling 
prices. Prices for solar PV have fallen by 
around 80 per cent since 2009 while the 
respective figure for wind is 30–40 per 
cent (IRENA, 2020b). Whereas the use of 
wind energy is still very limited in Africa, 
the use of solar energy has grown fast. 
The IEA projected that the use of solar 
PV will grow by more than 3000 per cent 
between 2018 and 2040 (IEA, 2019).
Off-grid renewable energy capacity 
in Africa has increased by nearly 360 
per cent, from 295 MW to 1.4 GW, dur-
ing the past decade (IRENA, 2020a). As 
FIGURE 2: POWER GENERATION CAPACITY ADDITIONS 
BY SOURCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2009–2018.
SOURCE: BNEF, 2020. 
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The declining costs of solar PV and 
the simultaneous emergence of 
pay-as-you-go business models that 
tap into the widespread availability 
of mobile phones have been key 
drivers for growth.
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off-grid power markets are more accessi-
ble to companies than on-grid utilities, 
which are often state owned, the num-
ber of renewable energy businesses on 
the continent has increased. Businesses 
can make use of pay-as-you-go business 
models that enable households to make 
mobile phone–based payments. Pay-as-
you-go business models in Africa exem-
plify the technological convergence of 
the global megatrends of electrification 
and digitalisation. Where digital con-
nectivity is available, businesses can, 
for example, monitor how off-grid sys-
tems function and whether payments are 
made on time.
The declining costs of solar PV and 
the simultaneous emergence of pay-as-
you-go business models that tap into the 
widespread availability of mobile phones 
have been key drivers for growth. Off-grid 
solar energy capacity has rocketed from a 
tiny 89 MW to 998 MW in ten years. Solar 
mini-grid capacity has increased, par-
ticularly in North Africa (Algeria), whilst 
solar lights and small solar home sys-
tem capacity has increased, especially 
in Eastern Africa, in countries such as 
Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda 
(IRENA, 2019, 2020a). In 2019, the fast-
est increase of solar pay-as-you-go unit 
sales was seen in West Africa, where many 
companies are expanding or licensing 
from East Africa. Solar home systems 
can be the cheapest power option where 
power demand is low and households are 
dispersed.
In addition to household systems, 
solar powered household appliances – es-
pecially TVs and fans – are becoming a 
major driver of the sector. Globally, most 
solar powered TVs are sold in East Africa 
(Lighting Global, 2020). However, solar 
powered agricultural and productive ap-
pliances, such as pumps or refrigeration 
appliances, are still few. In addition, the 
uptake of solar off-grid energy by indus-
trial parks, shopping malls, public insti-
tutions and other commercial and indus-
trial actors has remained slow despite its 
potential to substitute for the expensive 
diesel generators that are used as back-
ups for unreliable grids (Bhamidipati & 
Gregersen, 2020). 
Furthermore, the number of mi-
cro-grids is increasing fast globally and 
research shows that they could now be 
the best scalable option to solar home 
systems and grid extension. Currently, 
the largest share of the world’s planned 
micro-grid investments are in Africa 
(World Bank, 2019). Many countries re-
quire some form of license to set up 
distributions systems and sell power 
to customers, but several countries are 
excluding the smallest projects from 
certification requirements. Micro-grids 
are still reliant on subsidies and differ-
ent results-based financing schemes are 
entering the field (BNEF, 2020). 
 Climate change does not only spur 
renewable energy markets it also has 
more diverse effects on Africa’s energy 
economy. As a transition towards greener 
energy production takes place globally, 
demand for fossil fuels might decrease 
and cut revenues of African countries ex-
porting oil and gas, such as Nigeria and 
Angola. In contrast, the demand for min-
erals that are needed for battery technol-
ogy in power grids or electric cars, for 
example, is growing heavily. This means 
that the cobalt-exporting DRC will see 
a steady flow of export revenue as the 
country provides over 60 per cent of the 
world’s cobalt. Other African countries 
that export minerals that are needed for 
battery technology are Guinea, Gabon, 
Mozambique and Madagascar. While cur-
rent mineral sources will not be enough 
to cater for the needs in the global bat-
tery technology market, the circular 
economy (i.e. the reuse and recycling 
of minerals) becomes ever more crucial 
(Hund et al., 2020). These trends under-
score the need for African countries to 
diversify their economies and to think 
strategically about the continent’s en-
ergy future.  
The Ministry of Energy and Minerals in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
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THERE IS AMPLE political commitment 
to improve energy access in Africa. This 
commitment is spelled out in continen-
tal and Africa-led initiatives aiming for 
improved energy access and achieving 
interconnections between national grids. 
The Program for Infrastructure Devel-
opment in Africa (PIDA, with its Africa 
Power Vision (APV), the Africa Renewable 
Energy Initiative (AREI) by the AU and 
the New Deal on Energy for Africa (NDEA) 
by the AfDB are the main drivers of Afri-
can energy policy and integration. 
The AU’s and AfDB’s energy visions 
are largely connected around increasing 
regional energy integration and imple-
menting critical energy projects. Many 
of these are large hydro power projects. 
The PIDA programme has identified 15 
priority projects, mostly dams and re-
gional transmission lines. These are 
estimated to cost about US$40 billion 
(PIDA energy vision, n.d.). In addition, 
the AU’s Agenda 2063 defined the Grand 
Inga Dam project in the DRC as one of its 
high priorities. 
The AREI aims at increasing renew-
able energy generation capacity by 2030 
to 300 GW through promoting socially 
and environmentally appropriate solar, 
wind, hydro, biomass, geothermal and 
marine power. The AfDB has, for exam-
ple, a Desert to Power Programme that 
aims to light up and power the Sahel 
Policy and 
investment 
environment of 
energy connectivity
 China is 
the largest 
bilateral for eign 
financier of the 
African power 
sector, mainly 
through loans.
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region by building 10 GW worth of solar 
systems via public, private, grid and off-
grid projects by 2025.
There are five regional power pools in 
Africa. These are the Central Africa Power 
Pool (CAPP), the Comité Maghrebin de 
l’Electricite (COMELEC), the Eastern Af-
rica Power Pool (EAPP), the Southern 
Africa Power Pool (SAPP) and the West 
Africa Power Pool (WAPP). Electricity 
production and consumption is highest 
in COMELEC, followed by SAPP, EAPP and 
WAPP. CAPP produces the least electric-
ity. COMELEC is linked to the Middle East 
and Europe. Cross-border power trade in 
the power pools is still very limited and 
mainly takes place within SAPP. In 2014 
EAPP and SAPP launched a regional ini-
tiative, the Africa Clean Energy Corridor, 
which promotes renewable energy poten-
tial and cross-border electricity trade be-
tween the two pools. 
Were energy integration to deepen, 
Africa could save significantly in invest-
ments and the cost of electricity. The IEA 
has estimated that full integration would 
mean a US$43 billion per year or a 21 
per cent saving in the cost of electricity 
(World Energy Outlook, 2019). However, 
there are a number of constraints that 
hinder power pool development and oper-
ation in Africa. These include inadequate 
capacity and reserve margins, difficul-
ties in mobilising investment, low levels 
of public and private funding, policies 
that constrain or fail to incentivise in-
vestment, regulation that distorts the 
market, a lack of human resources and 
a lack of information and data about the 
energy situation. Regions lack harmo-
nised legislation and compatible grids 
(UNEP, 2017). Ultimately, it is a question 
about national priorities and interests. 
In many countries, power supply plans 
are nation-centric and state monopo-
lies dominate them. In some cases, re-
gional energy projects can even lead to 
disputes, as is the case with Ethiopia, 
Egypt and Sudan in regard to the Grand 
Renaissance Dam on the Nile.
***
On a national level, a combination of 
enabling policies and investments has 
put some countries on track to reach 
universal energy access by 2030. These 
include, for example, Gabon, Ghana, 
Kenya and Ethiopia. South Africa, Cape 
Verde, Ghana, Kenya and Gabon have 
made significant progress in rural elec-
trification. In these countries, on average 
at least 40 per cent of rural populations 
are connected to the grid (UNEP, 2017). 
Kenya has made significant progress in a 
transformation towards renewable energy 
and in ‘last mile connectivity’, that is, 
connecting every household within 600 
meters of distribution transformers. Re-
newable energy – wind, solar, hydro and 
geothermal energy – now accounts for 
70 per cent of the installed electricity 
generation capacity in the country (Re-
s4Africa, 2018).
The majority of African countries have 
not separated electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution into sep-
arate operating units. However, different 
national constellations vary. In a study 
by the World Bank in 2016, 19 countries 
had complete state monopoly of all three 
utilities. Only four countries – Ghana, Ni-
geria, Uganda and Sudan – had unbun-
dled the sector into separate units and 
had the most developed energy markets. 
However, these markets were not compet-
itive. The same study estimated that, out 
of a sample of 39 countries, only Uganda 
and the Seychelles had financially via-
ble electricity sectors. Only 19 countries 
covered operating expenditures and sev-
eral countries lost, on average, US$0.25 
per KWh sold. The main reasons for these 
losses were found to be under-pricing, 
transmission and distribution costs, bill 
collection inefficiencies and overstaffing 
(Trimble et al., 2016). 
Many countries have made long-term 
power purchase agreements (PPAs) with 
fossil fuel–based independent power pro-
ducers (IPPs). These can heavily limit 
governments’ ability to diversify their 
power supply in the short term, increase 
sovereign debt and hence keep the retail 
price of power high. Some governments, 
such as those of Ghana and South Africa, 
are trying to renegotiate long-term PPAs 
(BNEF, 2020). 
In general, energy policies have been 
changing slowly. Renewable energy is 
mainly supported with targets and tax 
exemptions. Net metering and carbon 
pricing are limited to just a few coun-
tries. In sub-Saharan Africa, 23 countries 
have implemented import duty and VAT 
exemptions. Renewable energy feed-in 
tariffs, which have been popular globally, 
have been rare in Africa. The recently 
introduced renewable energy auctions 
have been more successful in reaching 
competitive prices. So far, auctions have 
taken place in 16 countries across the 
continent. Seven countries have a policy 
in place but no bids yet. Some auctions, 
such as those in Senegal and Zambia, 
have resulted in large-scale renewables 
projects with some of the world’s lowest 
prices (BNEF, 2020).
***
Among the most important supporters 
of Africa’s energy and electricity sectors 
are China, the US, the EU and multilat-
eral development banks. Other countries, 
such as India and Russia, remain mar-
ginal but have increased their presence 
in the continent’s energy markets. Indian 
companies are, for example, operating in 
solar energy and Russia is promoting its 
nuclear industry in order to gain invest-
ments in Africa.
China is the largest bilateral for-
eign financier of the African power sec-
tor, mainly through loans. China has a 
Global Interconnectedness Initiative, 
which aims at creating the world’s first 
global electricity grid (Kynge & Hornby, 
2018). In 2017 China committed more 
than US$9 billion to the African power 
sector while the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation, the EC, the 
European Investment Bank, the Islamic 
Investment Bank and Afreximbank, to-
gether with all the G8 countries, made 
commitments of about US$5.8 billion 
to the sector (ICA, 2018). The extension 
of national grids is likely to receive the 
most foreign investments during 2018–
2030. Micro-grids will receive the sec-
ond largest share, followed by solar home 
systems (BNEF, 2020).
In addition to lending, Chinese com-
panies have been awarded many infra-
structure projects through public pro-
curement. In 2019 there were 242 power 
projects in Africa for which contracts had 
been awarded for stages ranging from 
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planning to execution. Of these projects, 
63 had Chinese companies as the main 
contractors (Power Technology, 2019). 
Chinese contractors operate in many 
hydropower projects. More than half 
of the new hydropower capacity will be 
built by Chinese contractors, followed by 
coal projects (29.3%) and gas projects 
(10.7%) (Power Technology, 2019). No-
where else does China engage as much in 
the hydropower sector as in Africa (Gal-
lagher, 2019).
While many international lenders are 
turning away from coal due to climate 
change, Chinese banks continue to act as 
last resort lenders for coal plants, also in 
Africa. China has new coal projects in 10 
African countries. Some of these projects 
involve coal mining in addition to plants 
(IEEFA, 2019). Despite their engagement 
in fossil energy, Chinese companies also 
invest in renewable energy and have been 
awarded the construction a wind park in 
Ethiopia, a solar farm in Ghana, a solar 
power plant in Zimbabwe and the world’s 
largest solar farm in Egypt (Power Tech-
nology, 2019).
Financing for renewable energy, ex-
cluding large hydro projects, comes 
mainly from multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank, the EU, the UN 
and the AfDB. Most foreign direct invest-
ment into renewable energy comes from 
European companies. The US is the larg-
est bilateral financer through its Power 
Africa Initiative (BNEF, 2019, 2020). Al-
though the country prioritises the devel-
opment of liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
it also funds solar, wind, biomass and 
geothermal projects in both grid and off-
grid settings. In addition to supporting 
renewable energy projects, OECD coun-
tries share an interest in developing en-
ergy market regulation and in liberalising 
energy markets. 
The EU has had an energy partnership 
with Africa since 2007. The aim of the 
EU’s cooperation has been to enable ac-
cess to electricity for 30 million people 
and to add the energy generation capac-
ity of 5 GW (EU, 2018). In its recent strat-
egy with Africa, the EC emphasises coop-
eration in renewable energy and plans to 
launch a Green Energy Initiative. The EU 
wants to see Africa on a low-carbon green 
growth trajectory that resists new invest-
ment in coal power (EU/EEAS, 2020).
While European countries, the US and 
China are pulling in somewhat different 
directions in their energy cooperation 
with Africa, companies from these coun-
tries cooperate in different power proj-
ects. For example, the US firm General 
Electric and Power China have been work-
ing together in several power projects in 
Nigeria (Sun, 2018).
On the other hand, Africa has a role in 
fulfilling China’s, the US’s, Europe’s and 
other countries’ energy needs. Chinese in-
volvement in oil and gas exploration and 
production in Africa has increased heav-
ily during the 2000s. Currently China re-
ceives more than 25 per cent of its oil 
supply from Africa. China Petroleum & 
Chemical Corporation Sinopec, China Na-
tional Petroleum Corporation and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation are 
present in nearly 20 countries in Africa 
and are estimated to invest over US$15 
billion in the continent during 2019–
2023. This is more than they invest in 
any other region in the world (Africa Oil 
Week, 2019). In contrast, only Nigeria 
and Libya are among Europe’s top ten 
crude oil import countries, and sub-Sa-
haran African oil exporters have a quite 
marginal share of the total. Also, the US 
has shown a decline in Africa’s share of 
its total oil imports.
FIGURE 3: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS TO RENEWABLES 
PROJECTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA BY REGION OF ORIGIN
SOURCE: BNEF, 2020. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS of univer-
sal access to sustainable and affordable 
energy are extensive. Reliable electricity 
generation would support Africa’s will to 
industrialise and to be part of the fourth 
industrial revolution. The provision of 
reliable electricity could even spur gov-
ernment legitimacy to collect more tax 
revenue and increase public funding by 
creating an implicit fiscal pact between 
citizens and their governments (Blimpo 
et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, energy is tightly con-
nected to climate change. Although Af-
rica’s global share of CO2 emissions is 
only about three per cent, its energy 
investments affect and are affected by 
climate change. On one hand, an en-
ergy transformation to renewable en-
ergy would cut Africa’s CO2 emissions 
and put the continent on a path towards 
sustainable economic development. 
The continent’s vast solar resources 
equal 90–100 million tonnes of oil per 
year (UNEP, 2017). On the other hand, 
the heavy energy dependence on fuel-
wood and charcoal, combined with cli-
mate change, creates a vicious circle for 
households in sub-Saharan Africa. Both 
are connected to deforestation and veg-
etation loss, which restrict the access to 
more fuelwood and charcoal. Droughts 
caused by climate change can also lead 
to increased power shortages in regions 
that depend on hydropower. The driest 
climate scenarios could entail losses of 
hydropower revenues of between 5–60 
per cent and increases in consumer ex-
penditure on energy of up to three times 
(Cervigni et al., 2015). The Zambesi river 
is likely to be worst hit by droughts due 
to climate change and affect the power 
supply of Zambia and Zimbabwe (BNEF, 
2020).
In light of the current and future un-
derstanding of energy connectivity in 
Africa, this report makes the following 
recommendations:
Recommendations 
for Finland and the 
EU for supporting 
sustainable energy 
connectivity 
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 — Connecting people to electricity 
is crucial. As technology is develop-
ing fast, reliable access to electric-
ity plays a crucial role for inclusion 
in society. A low hanging fruit for 
increasing connectivity to electricity 
could be to support access for the 
millions of Africans who live under 
the grid in growing urban areas but 
cannot, for various reasons, afford 
to connect. As grids all over Africa 
remain very unreliable, investing 
money in connectivity can become 
a risk not worth taking for many 
low-income earners. Improving the 
operation and maintenance of exist-
ing and future power plants would 
tackle large operational losses that 
currently occur in energy provision. 
Including a component on long-
term maintenance in any new energy 
investments could deliver significant 
benefits in terms of improved reli-
ability. Sufficient funding for ongo-
ing maintenance in the long term 
should be ensured. In addition to 
grid connectivity, decentralised off-
grid solutions can be important for 
providing access to rural populations 
and also serve as back-ups for public 
and commercial actors that suffer 
from grid unreliability and use die-
sel-powered generators. Small-scale 
solutions that operate on mobile and 
pay-as-you-go platforms could also 
be broadened to cover devices that 
generate income and enhance pro-
ductivity. Examples of such devices 
are solar pumps and refrigerators. 
 — Continued support for a sustain-
able transformation towards a 
zero-carbon economy is needed. 
The recovery measures of the COVID-
19 pandemic could be used for sup-
porting such a transition. Research 
indicates that in the long term, 
renewable energy is economically 
and environmentally the best option 
for fulfilling Africa’s energy needs 
and that its potential in Africa is 
unlimited. Political will for large-
scale hydro energy is strong, but 
more diversified renewable energy 
sources – solar, wind, geothermal, 
biomass sources – would make 
energy generation in Africa less vul-
nerable to droughts and avoid the 
social and ecological destruction 
caused by dams. Despite the large 
potential of linking agro-industries 
and the energy sector together, 
biomass energy on different scales 
is still very undeveloped and only 
limited flows of funds and efforts 
are flowing to the sector. Mobile 
platform companies have also yet 
to engage in the sector. Large-scale 
agro-based biomass co-generation 
could increase the productivity and 
income levels of rural farmers.  
 — An energy transformation from 
fossil fuel use to renewable 
energy requires commitment, 
political will, skills and capital 
from all parties. A more decentral-
ised approach to energy planning, 
grid flexibility and the integration 
of renewable energy technology, 
both on grid and off grid, are neces-
sary enablers for a green transition 
to take place. Renewable energy 
auctions, and in some cases also 
feed-in-tariffs, can be successful 
for reaching competitive prices 
and making important initial steps 
towards an energy transformation 
through large-scale renewable energy 
projects.  
 — For an energy transformation to 
take place, Africans have to have 
ownership of the process. Energy 
investments have to support local 
institutions, knowledge, markets 
and private sector development 
and energy planning has to be done 
locally. Sufficient knowledge and 
skills in energy planning, techni-
cal modelling and economics are 
required or else the interventions 
will remain in the hands of foreign 
investors, donors and other actors. 
In many countries, capacity for and 
skills in renewable energy already 
exist but are scattered and hence not 
sufficiently mobilised and operation-
alised. Universities can play a key 
role in sustaining skills and knowl-
edge networks on a national level 
that can support creating long-term 
energy visions for their countries. 
Where there is a lack of skills, pro-
grammes to support institutional 
capacity can be useful. Furthermore, 
financial support for energy invest-
ments have to support local compa-
nies and entrepreneurs in Africa to 
grow and expand. This could be done 
with direct funding to local actors, 
with joint projects between local and 
foreign companies, with co-owner-
ship models and with mutual learn-
ing in every project.  
 — Social and environmental sustain-
ability must be key principles in 
all energy investments. Whether 
energy investments are in fossil 
fuels or renewable energy, they can 
have large negative social and envi-
ronmental impacts. They can spur 
social opposition and conflicts, and 
have negative impacts on ecosys-
tems. Large-scale investments that 
require large areas of land are often 
met with opposition from the com-
munities who reside on those lands 
and whose livelihoods are dependent 
on them. This can also happen in 
relation to renewable energy invest-
ments, such as investments in solar 
and wind farms, even though they 
are perceived as otherwise sustain-
able (e.g. Rignall, 2015). Further-
more, large hydropower dams have 
caused massive socioeconomic and 
environmental damages in many 
parts of the world (Moran et al., 
2018). A review of 67 infrastructure 
projects in Africa show that almost 
80 per cent have been delayed due 
to environmental and social issues. 
Social opposition and environmental 
concerns have been more common 
reasons for project delays than prob-
lems related to commercial issues 
(Res4Africa, 2018). This means that 
human rights due diligence pro-
cesses must be put in place and that 
free, prior and informed consent 
has to be ensured from the people 
affected by an investment. 
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THIS CHAPTER FOCUSES on the state of 
transport connectivity in Africa and sug-
gests modes of cooperation to facilitate 
the achievement of sustainable and cli-
mate-friendly transport connectivity be-
tween the continent and other regions, 
and within the continent. In Africa, trans-
port infrastructure has the biggest share 
of investment from internal and external 
sources; however, there is still a large gap 
in both the quality and quantity of trans-
port infrastructure needed to realise Afri-
ca’s connectivity goals. Therefore, Africa 
needs to address investment, structural 
and implementation gaps to enhance 
connectivity and integration. Among 
other partners, the EU can leverage its 
expertise and experience to enhance the 
sustainability of Africa’s connectivity 
agenda. 
Summary
There is still a large gap in both the 
quality and quantity of transport 
infrastructure needed to realise 
Africa’s connectivity goals.
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FOR AFRICA, transport connectivity is 
crucial for the reduction of trade costs, 
enhancing economic growth and promot-
ing regional integration. To achieve that, 
the AU estimates that improved infra-
structure (including energy, transport 
and Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) infrastructure) will in-
crease intra-African trade from the 15.2 
per cent of the period 2015–2017 to 50 
per cent by 2045 and Africa’s share of 
global trade will increase from 2 per cent 
to 12 per cent (UNECA & NEPAD, 2016). 
Although much has improved in the past 
two decades, intra-Africa transport con-
nectivity is still low and characterised by 
missing links. The connectivity between 
modes of transport and between coun-
tries is also poor due to irregular mainte-
nance. The underdeveloped transport in-
frastructure, non-tariff barriers and inef-
ficiency at customs and border crossings 
effectively increase transportation costs 
in Africa by 50–175 per cent compared to 
other regions. In addition, erratic energy 
supplies lower Africa’s business compet-
itiveness and hamper the electrification 
of railways and investment in electric ve-
hicles. Accordingly, the interconnection 
and interoperability of transport remains 
the biggest obstacle to integration in Af-
rica. 
However, there are efforts to increase 
transnational road corridors to enhance 
the efficient and secure movement of 
goods and people across borders and 
link landlocked countries to maritime 
ports. Ambitious transport infrastruc-
ture programmes, such as PIDA, reflect 
continental attempts to harness diverse 
funding modalities and the institutional 
capacities of regional and international 
financial institutions, development part-
ners, the private sector and governments 
in order to boost Africa’s transport in-
frastructure. For instance, in 2018, the 
AfDB approved funding for 1084 km of 
transnational roads, and by 2019, the 
continent had realised about 30 per cent 
of its overall infrastructure goals. In ad-
dition, Africa has made eight per cent 
Current 
understanding 
of transport 
connectivity in 
Africa
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progress in building its high-speed rail 
network, 16 per cent progress in opening 
up African skies and 29 per cent progress 
in building the Trans-African Highway 
(NEPAD, 2020). The underlying objec-
tive is that improved transport connectiv-
ity will bolster Africa’s industrialisation, 
tourism development, regional integra-
tion and competitiveness.
African countries through the AU 
and RECs are prioritising transport in-
frastructure as a facilitator for develop-
ment and integration. PIDA, which the 
AU inaugurated in 2012 with the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD) and AfDB, is the most import-
ant continent-wide project. It combines 
existing and previous continental infra-
structure initiatives, such as the NEPAD 
Short-Term Action Plan, the NEPAD Me-
dium- to Long-Term Strategic Framework 
and the AU Infrastructure Master Plans, 
into one coherent programme. According 
to the AU Commission (2012, p. 1), it ‘af-
fords proper weight to the value of local 
ownership, the necessity of both hard and 
soft interventions, the need for diverse 
financing and the importance of sound 
implementation strategies.’ Accord-
ingly, through its Priority Action Plan, 
PIDA presents actionable infrastructure 
development projects and programmes 
that foster regional integration. 
So far, the first phase of PIDA (PAP 
I), which ran from 2012 to 2020, was es-
timated to cost US$67.9 billion but has 
so far spent US$81.6 billion. PIDA PAP I 
consists of 232 transport infrastructure 
projects which cost US$34 billion in 
total, 41.7 per cent of the entire PIDA 
PAP I expenditure. The projects are at 
different levels of implementation, with 
9.3 per cent of the projects at the ten-
dering stage, 23.8 per cent under con-
struction and 19.2 per cent in operation. 
The second phase (PIDA PAP II) starts 
from 2021 and runs to 2030, focusing on 
projects proposed by RECs and member 
countries. The second phase will use a 
data-driven multi-infrastructure corridor 
approach that is more gender inclusive, 
creates jobs and is climate friendly. The 
emphasis is on high-capacity and effi-
cient transport corridors that are espe-
cially important for the 16 landlocked 
countries on the continent to connect 
with each other and the world. 
FIG. 1. THE AU’S REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL 
TRANSPORT PROJECTS
SOURCE: AU-PIDA, 2019. 
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Road transport
Road transport is the most dominant 
mode of transport in Africa – transport-
ing 80–90 per cent of the continent’s 
passengers and freight traffic. The AfDB 
estimates that 53 per cent of roads in 
Africa are unpaved, less than half of 
the rural population have access to an 
TABLE 1: A COMPARISON OF TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE QUALITY 
SOURCE: WORLD BANK (2018) AND WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM (2019). SSA = SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA; SA = SOUTH ASIA; MENA = THE MIDDLE EAST  
AND NORTH AFRICA; LAC = LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN; EAP = EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC
Indicator Years of  
compari-
son
Region
 
SSA SA MENA LAC EAP
World Economic Forum  
(Road Quality Score:  
0 = worst, 7 = best)
2006 2.4 3.0 4.2 3.1 4.5
2019 3.7 4.0 4.9 4.0 4.7
Paved roads  
(% share of paved roads)
1990 17% 45% 54% 18% 58%
2010 16% 53% 79% 24% 71%
all-seasons road and one-fifth of global 
casualties from road accidents occur in 
Africa despite it having one of the lowest 
traffic densities in the world (4.2%). Of 
the paved roads, most are in bad condi-
tion due to the lack of regular mainte-
nance. The World Bank estimates that a 
US$12 billion investment in maintenance 
in the 1990s would have saved Africa 
about US$45 billion in subsequent road 
reconstruction costs. To increase their 
maintenance capabilities, 35 African 
countries created policies enabling the 
creation of second-generation road funds 
to oversee maintenance. Nonetheless, 80 
per cent of these countries are unable to 
collect enough levies to meet the mini-
mum financial requirements to perform 
preventive maintenance in a timely fash-
ion (Kaba & Assaf, 2019).  
The quality of African roads, there-
fore, lags behind other regions. Table 1 
below shows the difference in road qual-
ity scores. 
Within Africa, there are disparities in 
road access and the quality of roads be-
tween countries. For example, Egypt and 
the Seychelles score over 50 on the AfDB 
Transport Composite Index, measured as a 
weighted average of the total paved roads 
per 10,000 inhabitants and the total road 
network of exploitable land area. In con-
trast, Chad scores 0.2 on the index and the 
DRC, Somalia, Nigeria and Eritrea score 
below 2 on the index (AfDB, 2020).
With roads dominating African cities, 
rapid urbanisation and a growing Afri-
can middle class are resulting in traf-
fic congestion that is worse than in the 
cities of developing countries that have 
Road transport is the most 
dominant mode of transport in 
Africa – transporting 80–90 per 
cent of the continent’s passengers 
and freight traffic.
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higher private vehicle ownership. For ex-
ample, in Lagos, Nigeria, road transport 
accounts for approximately 95 per cent 
of passenger trips and 12 million trips 
per day. African urban mobility is there-
fore the main source of urban air pollu-
tion due to the increased use of mostly 
second-hand imported vehicles with low 
vehicle emission standards. A 2019 re-
port by UNICEF notes that deaths in Af-
rica from outdoor pollution increased by 
60 per cent, from 164,000 in 1990 to 
about 258,000 in 2017, and is leading 
to an annual GDP loss of approximately 
US$215 billion. In addition, only 41 Af-
rican cities track air quality. Nearly 80 
per cent of the vehicle fleet in African 
countries is imported, and half of the 
continent has no restrictions on vehicle 
importations (UNEP, n.d.). Existing ve-
hicle regulatory gaps between developed 
and developing countries hinder the goal 
to lower emissions and efforts to curb 
climate change, thus air pollution–re-
lated health complications contribute 
to increased mortality in Africa. Despite 
these challenges, road infrastructure 
receives more investment for new con-
struction and maintenance than other 
modes of transport.
Rail transport 
Rail transport has the greatest potential 
to increase energy efficiency and mini-
mise greenhouse gas emissions in Africa, 
but it remains the least developed form 
of transport (AfDB, 2015). Statistics 
by the International Union of Railways 
(UIC) suggest that Africa’s global share 
of rail passenger-kilometres is one per 
cent, its share of freight (tonne-kilome-
tre) is two per cent and it has a seven 
per cent of the rail lines and tracks (in 
terms of length). In total, Africa has 
approximately ‘84,000 kilometres of 
rail track, for a surface of about 30 mil-
lion square kilometres, and most of it is 
in Southern and Northern Africa’ (AfDB, 
2014, p. 51). Of that, only 84 per cent is 
operational and it is often outdated and 
characterised by low-speed, inefficient 
and undercapitalised rail lines. 
With the exception of South Africa 
and Egypt, which have electrified and 
double-tracked rail networks, the rest 
of Africa has an inefficient and poor rail 
infrastructure. Egypt accounts for an es-
timated 85 per cent of the passengers 
The average rail network density for 
the majority of African countries is 
between 30 and 50 kilometres per 
million people, which is far below 
Europe’s average of about 200–1000 
kilometres per million people.
A bicycle passes a truck in the mining region in Shinyanga, Tanzania.
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carried on the continent while South 
Africa accounts for most of the freight 
with upwards of 80 per cent of the total 
freight transported by rail in Africa. The 
average rail network density for the ma-
jority of African countries is between 30 
and 50 kilometres per million people, 
which is far below Europe’s average of 
about 200–1000 kilometres per mil-
lion people. In Africa, only South Africa, 
Gabon and Botswana have more than 400 
kilometres per million people. 
Cross-border railway connections 
between African countries are still un-
derdeveloped and mostly non-existent. 
This is partly because, according to the 
AU, ‘sixteen countries still do not have 
railway lines or sections of international 
lines.’ Those with national railway net-
works are not interconnected, except for 
parts in Eastern, Western and Southern 
Africa, most notably Burkina Faso – Cote 
d’Ivoire, Senegal-Mali and the recently 
completed Ethiopia–Djibouti railway. The 
Standard Railway Gauge, mostly funded 
by loans from the China EXIM Bank, will 
connect Kenya, Rwanda, the DRC, Uganda 
and South Sudan by the end of 2025. De-
spite these railway infrastructure devel-
opments, what continues to hinder inter-
connectivity and interoperability is the 
lack of harmonisation and standardisa-
tion of technical standards and specifica-
tions, including gauges (metric and stan-
dard), which are different across Africa. 
Some African countries have intro-
duced railway concession policies to at-
tract private investment, and emerging 
economic powers like China are granting 
loans, at the request of African coun-
tries, for rail and light rail construction. 
For example, Chinese loans funded the 
construction of the light railway in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, the Abuja–Kaduna rail-
way in Nigeria, the Lobito–Luau railway 
in Angola, the Nairobi–Mombasa railway 
in Kenya and the Addis Ababa–Djibouti 
railway linking Addis Ababa to the port 
in Djibouti, Djibouti. While the comple-
tion of the Nairobi–Mombasa railway and 
the new Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway is 
a success, they costed upwards of US$4 
billion each. Both are operating below ca-
pacity, which forced the two governments 
to request the Chinese government to re-
schedule their loans from a 10-year to a 
30-year repayment period. 
In addition to Chinese loans, private 
operators now manage over 70 per cent 
of the railway transport activities, and 
as of 2019, railway investments signifi-
cantly increased (World Bank, 2019). Mo-
tivations for these projects vary across 
countries. Recent studies indicate that 
some political leaders implement the 
projects with Chinese loans in order to 
achieve personal political objectives; 
in Ethiopia, the light rail and the Addis 
Ababa–Djibouti rail are part of the coun-
try’s national development plans.
Air transport
Africa’s aviation industry has grown rela-
tively stronger over the past decade due 
to the sustained economic growth that 
has given rise to rapid urbanisation and 
an African middle class. Nonetheless, Af-
rica’s air transport industry is the small-
est in the world, though it has potential 
to become the next frontier for growth 
FIGURE 2: 2019 WORLDWIDE AIR TRAFFIC FLOW
SOURCE: ICAO
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(PWC, 2015). World Air Transport Statis-
tics show that, in 2018 (as shown in Fig. 
2), Africa’s share of the global scheduled 
passenger and freight traffic was the low-
est, at just 2.2 per cent, compared with 
Latin America’s 4.5 per cent and the Mid-
dle East’s 10.4 per cent. Although the 
freight volumes carried by African air-
lines remained stable in 2018, following 
a 24 per cent growth in 2017, airlines in 
Africa face a challenging operating envi-
ronment (WATS, 2019). In addition to the 
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, avia-
tion in Africa faces weak and outdated 
infrastructure that is unable to support 
growth in passenger and cargo volumes. 
Most of the infrastructure, such as air-
ports, is managed by government enti-
ties or regulatory bodies that discourage 
private investment, leading to poor con-
nectivity, a lack of liberalisation and high 
ticket prices (El-Houry, 2019).
Only five African countries – South Af-
rica, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria and Ethio-
pia – have achieved between 50 per cent 
to 64 per cent connectivity, which is a 
measure of the degree of integration with 
the global air transport network. Other 
countries – such as Lesotho, Eswatini, 
Burundi, the Gambia, Guinea, Benin, 
Malawi, Chad, Mauritania and Burkina 
Faso – are the worst connected, with a 
degree of connectivity ranging from 5.8 
per cent to 15 per cent (IATA, 2019). Af-
rica, alongside Asia and South America, 
presents opportunities for new route de-
velopment and network expansion for 
global airlines that may result in lower 
prices for both passenger and cargo air 
transport. The International Air Transport 
Association (IATA) estimates that a one 
per cent increase in air cargo connectiv-
ity can lead to a six per cent increase in 
trade for a country – mostly through en-
hanced access to markets, tourism and 
the flow of human and investment capital 
across borders. 
To improve air transport connectivity, 
Africa needs efficient airlines and an en-
abling regulatory environment. To meet 
the expected annual growth in passenger 
and cargo traffic of 5.2 per cent for the 
next two decades, most of the existing 
731 airports on the continent need to be 
modernised. Investment in the aviation 
sector is much needed, particularly in 
maintenance and air control technology – 
for that, African countries need to spend 
not less than 0.1 per cent of their GDP 
on airport infrastructure (GIH, 2017). 
However, because African governments 
play a dominant role in both airport and 
airline investment and management, pri-
vate investments in airports is still rare. 
Nonetheless, unlike airport infrastruc-
ture, airport services across the conti-
nent have benefited from the participa-
tion of private players, such as Swissport, 
which operates airport ground services in 
42 airports across Africa. 
Over 400 airlines from across the 
world operate in the African aviation in-
dustry. European and other foreign car-
riers account for 70 per cent of current 
air travel in the continent, resulting in 
unnecessary routings through Europe 
and the Middle East, which does not en-
hance intra-Africa connectivity. In par-
ticular, Emirates and Turkish Airlines 
dominate the African market. South 
African Airways, Ethiopian Airways and 
Kenya Airways have the rest of the market 
share. Smaller private carriers operate 
domestic routes but without government 
subsidies and bailouts, they are negligi-
ble. Although most airlines in Africa are 
government owned, public-private invest-
ments are emerging. Kenya Airlines and 
Rwanda Air are examples of such airlines. 
To enhance air transport connectiv-
ity, African governments initiated the 
Yamoussoukro Decision, which entered 
into force in 2000. The decision, based 
on the Yamoussoukro Declaration of 
1988, seek to deal with the restrictive 
and protectionist intra-African regulatory 
regime based on bilateral air services 
agreements. By establishing a Single Af-
rican Air Transport Market, the Yamous-
soukro Decision will deepen the African 
air service market, ease intra-Africa 
connectivity, increase efficiency, reduce 
costs and improve tourism. However, the 
implementation of the decision is slow, 
and national markets are characterised 
by protectionist policies that hinder 
free competition, leaving the African air 
transport market with disproportionately 
high airfares, inefficient services and 
poor intra-African connectivity. 
Africa’s share of the global 
scheduled passenger and freight 
traffic was the lowest, at just 2.2 
per cent, compared with Latin 
America’s 4.5 per cent and the 
Middle East’s 10.4 per cent.
To improve 
air transport 
connectivity, 
Africa needs 
efficient airlines 
and an enabling 
regulatory 
environment. 
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The effects of COVID-19 on the con-
tinent might further derail implemen-
tation of the Yamoussoukro Decision as 
governments seek to keep their national 
airlines afloat. The IATA estimates a loss 
of US$6 billion to African Airlines due 
to a 51 per cent decline in traffic (IATA, 
2020). The World Tourism Organisation, 
a specialised agency of the UN (UNWTO) 
estimates a 20–30 per cent decline in 
international tourism receipts worldwide 
due to the pandemic. Overall, although 
improving air transport connectivity is 
imperative for Africa’s growth and inte-
gration, it is critical to note that aviation 
expansion will come with a significant 
environmental impact, further affecting 
many countries that are already vulnera-
ble to climate change. 
Sea transport
Maritime transport is the key mode of 
moving freight to and from Africa, but 
according to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) (2018, p. 2), the expansion of 
ports and expenditure on port assets is 
not keeping up with the increase in Afri-
ca’s foreign trade. In 2018, Africa only 
had a four per cent share of the global 
container port traffic, slightly ahead of 
the Oceania, which had a two per cent 
share. Africa’s paltry share of the global 
container port traffic reflects its partic-
ipation level in the global production 
and supply chains. In terms of per-
centage share in world tonnage, Africa 
constituted seven per cent of the total 
goods loaded and five per cent of the 
total goods unloaded – the lowest per-
centage compared to other regions. The 
most connected ports in Africa are in 
Egypt, Morocco and South Africa, South 
Africa being the most dominant – four 
of the top 10 ports in Southern Africa 
are in South Africa, namely Durban, Cape 
Town, Coega and Port Elizabeth (UNIT-
CAD, 2019). 
Western Africa has relatively low con-
nectivity due to its geographical posi-
tion. However, Lomé, Togo, has become 
the leading hub port in West Africa. The 
emergence of Togo as an important hub 
was the result of modernisation reforms 
and direct services from China, as well as 
being a result of congestion at the port 
of Lagos. Djibouti is Africa’s leading port 
in the Red Sea and an important gate-
way for international trade. Port Louis, 
Mauritius, is the best-connected port in 
East Africa because Mombasa and Dar 
es Salaam have been relatively stagnant 
due to high congestion. Reforms and in-
vestment are required to modernise ex-
isting ports, build new ones, encourage 
competition between ports and improve 
interconnectedness between ports and 
hinterland countries. 
An increase in Africa’s trade with 
China has led to an upsurge in public and 
private investments in port projects. Port 
investments worth US$4.9 billion across 
15 countries were recorded in 2019. For 
instance, the Lekki Deep Sea Port Phase 
I. Lekki Port, with a 1200 TEU capacity, 
is expected to become one of the largest 
deep-water ports in West Africa, changing 
the dynamics on the continent. However, 
unlike road transport, foreign investment 
dominates the revitalisation of Africa’s 
ports (World Bank, 2019). The Bagam-
oyo Port project in Tanzania, which would 
have been the biggest in the region, 
stalled because of unfavourable Chinese 
conditions for investment – suggesting 
the complexities of investment in and 
funding of transport infrastructure in 
Africa.
***
The infrastructure gap on the African 
continent varies from country to country 
and within countries. Between countries, 
the World Bank illustrated that it costs 
approximately US$625 and on average 
12 days to export a container from Egypt 
but that it costs nine times as much and 
takes four times as long to transport the 
same container from the Central African 
Republic. In terms of road density (km/
km²), sub-Saharan Africa has a road den-
sity of 0.14 km/km², which is among the 
lowest of any geographic region. How-
ever, within Africa, the disparities in road 
density per country are glaring. For in-
stance, in 2011, Mauritania had a road 
density of 1.1 km per 100 km² of land 
compared to Kenya’s 27.7 km per 100 
km².  
An increase in Africa’s trade with 
China has led to an upsurge in 
public and private investments in 
port projects.
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The Infrastructure Consortium for Af-
rica (ICA)3 estimates that Africa needs 
an injection of US$34–47 billion annu-
ally to meet the transport infrastructure 
needs of its growing urbanised popula-
tion and to meet its economic growth 
needs. However, there is an annual gap 
of about US$4–16 billion. Approximately, 
80 per cent of the investment goes to-
wards maintenance, while 20 per cent 
goes toward new projects. Over 50 per 
cent of national infrastructure budgets 
go towards transport yearly. The invest-
ment gap in African infrastructure is 
only two per cent of the estimated global 
need, and it is low in comparison to the 
investment opportunities in African and 
global capital markets. With public funds 
failing to plug the gap in transport infra-
structure investment, there is need for 
strong public investment, private sector 
involvement and institutional investors, 
as well as development partners. 
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the Addis Ababa Ac-
tion Agenda on Financing for Develop-
ment, known as the Addis Ababa Ac-
tion Agenda, underscore the need for 
increased private sector engagement in 
the financing and implementation of in-
frastructure projects in Africa. Among 
other things, it recognised the need 
to harness domestic public resources, 
3  The ICA is a consortium launched at the G8 Gleneagles Summit in 2005 in order to facilitate the financing of infrastructure projects and programmes in Africa. 
Members include the G8 countries, South Africa, multilateral agencies (World Bank, International Financial Corporation, European Commission, European Investment 
Bank, Islamic Development Bank, Afreximbank), African institutions (Africa Development Bank, Development Bank of Southern Africa, West African Development Bank, 
the African Union Commission, UN Economic Commission for Africa, African Union Development Agency- New Partnership for Africa’s Development).
domestic and international private busi-
ness and finance, international develop-
ment cooperation and international trade 
as engines for development and sources 
of financing in order to plug Africa’s in-
frastructure gap. To reinforce the local 
ownership of transport infrastructure, 
African governments funded 42.1 per 
cent of the US$62.5 billion allocated for 
infrastructure development in Africa. The 
ICA provided nearly 30 per cent of the 
infrastructure financing in 2016. The rest 
came from the private sector and bilat-
eral partners such as China. 
African governments fund most of 
the infrastructure from their national 
budgets. Most do that through issuing 
Eurobonds in international bond mar-
kets in addition to external loans and 
grants, which account for nearly 90 per 
cent of their infrastructure budget. For 
instance, since 2000, China has provided 
Djibouti with nearly US$1.5 billion in fi-
nancing for major infrastructure proj-
ects including port facilities, a railway 
and two airports. The Johns Hopkins 
SAIS China–Africa Research Initiative 
estimates that from 2000 to 2017, Chi-
nese loans to Africa amount to US$145.7 
billion – much of it financing transport 
infrastructure. This has raised concerns 
about debt sustainability. According to 
the World Bank, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
the average debt-to-GDP ratio increased 
from 40 per cent in 2010 to 59 per cent 
in 2018. Furthermore, most of the fund-
ing agreements, particularly with China, 
are secretive and lack transparency. The 
assessment of funds from ICA1 members 
to Africa between 2015 and 2017 has 
shown that 73.4 per cent of infrastruc-
ture investment was debt and only 12.1 
per cent was grants. In 2018, the propor-
tion of debt decreased to 70.8 per cent 
and the proportion of grants decreased 
to 11.9 per cent.  
South Africa is one of the few African 
countries with eight per cent of its na-
tional roads developed and managed by 
private parties on thirty-year terms. The 
private parties build the roads, manage 
them and collect tolls for the duration 
of the term, then handover the roads to 
the government-owned South African Na-
tional Roads Agency SOC Limited. Despite 
there being potential for private sector 
investment in transport infrastructure, 
the lack of appropriate policy, legal and 
regulatory frameworks inhibit the fi-
nancing of transboundary infrastructure 
projects. Nonetheless, PwC suggest that 
sub-Saharan Africa has the fastest grow-
ing regional infrastructure market with a 
projected increase in transport spending 
of over 11 per cent per year from 2015 to 
2025. However, despite the high demand 
African governments fund most of the infra-
structure from their national budgets. Most do 
that through issuing Eurobonds in international 
bond markets in addition to external loans and 
grants, which account for nearly 90 per cent of 
their infrastructure budget.
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for private capital to fund Africa’s public 
infrastructure, the lack of bankable and 
financially viable projects mean that the 
infrastructure gap persists. 
The AfDB is central to financing 
transport infrastructure in Africa. For 
instance, it initiated the African Infra-
structure Investment Fund (AIIF), now 
in Phase 3. Phase 3 of AIIF (AIIF3) 
is an equity vehicle with a fund size 
of US$750 million. Between 2004 and 
2018, the AfDB injected US$8 billion in 
transport and urban development in Af-
rica. It financed 12,700 km of regional 
highway roads on 17 road corridors and 
built 26 One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) 
facilities. While public funds are the 
dominant source of infrastructure in-
vestment, African countries face several 
challenges in collecting and spending 
public funds. Africa’s failure to collect 
domestic revenue efficiently stems from 
its inability to tax the informal econ-
omy, inefficiencies in revenue collection 
and leakages of potential revenue due 
to endemic corruption. The informal 
economy is sub-Saharan Africa is, on 
average, 40 per cent of GDP. In countries 
like Tanzania, Benin and Nigeria, it can 
be 50–65 per cent (Medina, Jonelis, & 
Cangul, 2017). 
Recently, there is increasing diversity 
in infrastructure funding sources for the 
continent, which potentially empowers 
African governments to determine the 
nature of infrastructure investment they 
need and the terms thereof. Overseas 
development aid from multilateral de-
velopment banks and bilateral agree-
ments, individual African governments 
and bilateral partners such as China are 
the main sources of infrastructure fund-
ing. India and Turkey are also support-
ing infrastructure investments in Africa 
through loans and grants. For instance, 
India provided US$513 million for trans-
port projects in Africa – most of it being 
loans and grants from the Export–Im-
port Bank of India. In addition, India 
has used Buyer’s Credit under the Govern-
ment of India’s Buyer’s Credit - National 
Export Insurance Account (BC-NEIA) 
programme to support transport infra-
structure development in Africa. In 2018, 
While public 
funds are the 
dominant 
source of 
infrastructure 
investment, 
African 
countries 
face several 
challenges in 
collecting and 
spending public 
funds.
Light trail vehicle in Addis Ababa.
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India provided about US$1.25 billion for 
projects such as the Tema–Akosombo 
railway line construction in Ghana; Lu-
saka City Decongestion Project in Zam-
bia; the supply of buses to Côte d’Ivoire, 
Senegal and Tanzania; and the supply 
of vehicles and spares to Côte d’Ivoire, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe (Export–Import 
Bank of India, 2018).
Stakeholders – such as the AfDB, the 
AU, and other regional and global bod-
ies – have been instrumental in the con-
ception and de-risking of new funding 
mechanisms for infrastructure projects 
such as guarantee schemes that enable 
public-private partnerships and co-in-
vestment schemes with Multilateral De-
velopment Banks (MDB). A number of key 
players, such as the ICA, established a 
Project Preparation Facilities Network in 
order to increase the capacity of coun-
tries to present infrastructure projects. 
Nonetheless, the emphasis has been on 
seeking funding for individual projects. 
Not enough efforts are directed toward 
creating a market-based platform for 
raising sustainable project funding from 
global players.
In 2013, the AfDB issued the first 
green bond and it has to date floated 
eight more to support climate-friendly 
projects in Africa. Other players, such as 
the Industrial Development Corporation 
(IDC) and Nedbank, have issued green 
bonds in South Africa. The AfDB’s green 
bonds financed clean transportation in-
frastructure – such as the expansion of 
railways in South Africa, Morocco and 
Senegal – as well as building the rapid 
bus transit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
The UK funded Financial Sector Deepen-
ing Africa (FSD Africa) works with Afri-
can financial institutions to build their 
capacity to develop ecosystems for green 
bond financing. However, there is need 
to increase sustainable financing plat-
forms and mechanisms. The anticipated 
COVID-induced contraction or slowdown 
of the global economy will likely lead to 
a decline in tax revenue, official devel-
opment assistance (ODA), foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio investment 
inflows and remittance flows to Africa. 
OECD countries have advocated Aid 
for Trade as a more holistic mechanism 
to create an enabling environment for 
infrastructure investment and attract 
private sector financing in Africa. Af-
rica’s biggest five Aid for Trade donors 
are the World Bank, the EU (EU) insti-
tutions, Germany, the AfDB and Japan. 
‘The sectoral breakdown of Aid for Trade 
disbursements to Africa – economic in-
frastructure funding is distributed evenly 
between transport and storage (26 per 
cent of total) and energy (27 per cent). 
Over 71 per cent of the funds towards 
transport go into road transport, while 
around 10 percent for rail transport, with 
water and air transport receiving around 
5 per cent each’ (ECA & WTO, 2017, p. 9). 
In that respect, Aid for Trade has become 
an important source of support to Afri-
can countries in the development of not 
just their transport infrastructure but 
also their trade and productive capacity. 
However, to ensure that it supports Af-
rica’s development in a sustainable and 
efficient manner, it has to be aligned to 
Africa’s development priorities. It has 
also built the capacity of African govern-
ments to develop infrastructural projects 
that donors can successfully consider.
***
Africa has the potential to adopt more 
sustainable and environmentally friendly 
modes of transportation. In March 2018, 
during Africa Clean Mobility Week, 42 Af-
rican governments, the East African Com-
munity (EAC) and the Economic Com-
munity of West African States (ECOWAS) 
agreed to integrate sustainable trans-
port policies into their wider transport 
agenda. The agenda included promoting 
the import of cleaner, more fuel-efficient 
vehicles; promoting electric mobility in 
the region; creating mechanisms to reg-
ulate the import of clean, used vehicles; 
and the overall planning and financing 
of non-motorised transport and public 
transport in the region (UNEP, 2018). 
Zero-emission electric buses have been 
operating in Marrakesh, Morocco, since 
2017 and in Cairo, Egypt, since 2019. 
In both countries, Chinese firms, such 
as Shanghai Wanxiang Automobile and 
Yangtze, supplied the electric buses – 
making China the leading supplier of 
electric public transport buses in Africa. 
Not enough 
efforts are 
directed toward 
creating a 
market-based 
platform 
for raising 
sustainable 
project funding 
from global 
players.
Electric vehicles are still a rarity in Af-
rica. However, there are opportunities for 
electrified two- and three-wheeler taxis, 
which are common in African cities. Po-
tentially, they may attract private inves-
tors better due their cost-saving impact. 
Micro-mobility also presents investment 
potential in Africa. Generally, African 
mobility services are increasingly digitis-
ing – by 2024, 60 per cent of the services 
will be online (Statista, 2020). Earnings 
from ride hailing and taxi services are 
set to increase as global ride sharing 
companies, such as Uber and Bolt, add 
options to use small cars, minivans, auto 
rickshaws and motorcycles. A few local 
ride-hailing companies compete with 
global giants or apply the technology in 
other ways. For example, in Nigeria, a 
new social enterprise, HELLO TRACTOR, 
offers small-scale farmers a platform to 
request and pay for tractor services from 
tractor owners via SMS and paying with 
mobile money.
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The policy and 
investment 
environment 
of transport 
connectivity
TO ENHANCE TRANSPORT connectivity, 
Africa needs a robust and harmonised 
state, regional and continental transport 
regulatory and institutional framework. 
At present, transport policies and reg-
ulatory environments in Africa are weak 
and fragmented, thus constraining trans-
port connectivity far more than the poor 
transport infrastructure. For instance, 
African governments have not imple-
mented several sub-regional agreements 
relating to the construction, funding and 
operation of the Trans-Africa Highway 
network despite agreeing to them. This 
is partly due to no mechanisms for en-
forcing compliance and an absence of a 
secretariat to oversee the programme’s 
implementation. RECs also lack enforce-
ment or compliance enforcement capac-
ities. Furthermore, RECs often alter the 
original plans of the Trans-Africa High-
way to suit their economic and social 
interests, and most importantly, the po-
litical interests of their member states. 
In part, there seem to be a conflict of 
interest between member states, RECs 
and regional organisations such as the 
AU, hence most states revert to bilateral 
and national regulations. 
In addition, because governments ul-
timately fund regional and sub-regional 
transport infrastructure projects, they 
consider issues relating to such projects 
as matters of national interest. National 
projects prevail over regional or interna-
tional ones. Governments often assent 
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to the technical requirements of the re-
gional projects but act unilaterally on 
the implementation of the projects. The 
result is unequal implementation of re-
gional transport infrastructure projects, 
which inhibits efforts toward transport 
connectivity and regional integration. 
To harmonise and standardise regu-
lations, frameworks, standards and poli-
cies, RECs need to play a central role be-
cause they are in close contact with their 
member states. RECs, such as the South-
ern African Development Community 
(SADC), have tried to balance regional 
and national interests as well as foster 
the harmonisation of transport regu-
lations, such as the standardisation of 
axle widths, ton size, road shoulders and 
signage. With the help of THE United Na-
tions Environment Programme (UNEP), 
15 ECOWAS member countries are head-
ing towards a low-emission future with 
the harmonisation and standardisation 
of fuel and vehicle standards. Apart from 
SADC and ECOWAS, other RECs are still a 
long way from the harmonisation of reg-
ulations and transport policies.
The harmonisation of policies and 
regulatory frameworks should extend to 
supporting infrastructures, such as those 
related to customs and border crossings. 
Across Africa, countries apply varied bor-
der and customs rules and procedures, 
which leads to processing delays at bor-
ders and a lack of uniformity of immi-
gration and customs documents. To deal 
with these challenges, the AfDB is sup-
porting OSBPs in Africa to enhance effi-
ciency, reduce waiting periods and lower 
logistics costs. For instance, the OSBP at 
the Chirundu Border Post between Zimba-
bwe and Zambia reduced the travel time 
across the border by a day or more (from 
five days to four days). Now, according to 
the AU-PIDA website, there are approxi-
mately 76 OSBPs at various stages of de-
velopment in Africa. In addition, NEPAD 
and ECA are developing a framework to 
harmonise policies, laws and regulations 
related to infrastructure investment. 
Furthermore, African countries have 
struggled to attract private sector invest-
ment in transport infrastructure due to 
lack of clarity on legislation, the enforce-
ment of commercial law and transparency 
in procurement. ‘The absence of enabling 
legislation and regulations, a lack of local 
skills and a poor understanding of public–
private partnership (PPP) risk allocation 
are all bottlenecks currently preventing 
many countries from fully unlocking pri-
vate sector interest, particularly on re-
gional projects’ (AUC et al., 2012, p. 7). 
Accordingly, soft projects – such as sup-
porting the harmonisation of transport 
procedures and regulations, the better 
management of cross-border infrastruc-
tures (such as customs clearance) and the 
capacity building of authorities in specific 
transport sectors – can potentially reduce 
transit costs, increase cross-border trade 
and enhance productivity.
Three-wheeler taxis are waiting for passengers in front of a shopping centre in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
H
EN
R
I PU
R
JE
CONNECTING AFRICA – TRANSPORT CONNECTIVITY38
Recommendations 
for Finland and 
the EU related 
to supporting 
transport 
connectivity 
FINLAND AND THE EU can support Africa 
in achieving its connectivity goals, in-
volving itself, the EU and the rest of the 
world in a financially, socially and en-
vironmentally sustainable manner. The 
recommendations are the following:
 — Support a connectivity agenda 
that promotes African regional 
integration. This can be done by 
providing direct support to African 
connectivity priorities. Of impor-
tance is the Action Plan for Boost-
ing Intra-African Trade, which 
was adopted by the Assembly of the 
Heads of State and Government of 
the African Union in January 2012, 
sets eight priorities for Africa, 
namely, trade policy, trade facilita-
tion, productive capacity clusters, 
trade-related infrastructure, trade 
finance, trade information and 
factor-market integration. Under 
trade-related infrastructure, the 
Action Plan sets to undertake the 
following activities: (1) implement-
ing PIDA, (2) mobilising resources 
for multi-country projects, (3) cre-
ating an enabling environment for 
private sector participation and (4) 
developing innovative mechanisms 
(such as legal and financial mech-
anisms) for multi-country projects. 
External support to RECs and govern-
ments to develop innovative legal, 
financial and other mechanisms for 
multi-country infrastructure and 
industrial projects, as well as to 
manage these projects from incep-
tion to operation, is essential. In 
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addition, providing technical support 
for the standardisation and harmoni-
sation of resource mobilisation poli-
cies and transport regulatory frame-
works, which remain fragmented 
across African regions, can be fruit-
ful. The expansion of the Trans-Euro-
pean Transport Network (TEN-T) into 
North Africa provides a suitable pilot 
for enhanced EU-Africa cooperation 
on transport and connectivity. 
 — Promote financial sustainabil-
ity in addressing the transport 
infrastructure investment gap. 
To develop models for cooperation 
with Africa regarding transport 
infrastructure development, there is 
need to align the interests of the pri-
vate sector and external stakehold-
ers (such as the EU and Finland) 
in regard to Africa’s regional and 
sub-regional transport infrastructure 
goals. The EU’s external investment 
plan and the Africa–EU Alliance’s 
already focus on boosting strategic 
investment and strengthening the 
role of the private sector, as well 
as focussing on investment in eco-
nomic integration and trade, in order 
to provide an essential foundation 
for strengthening the EU’s cooper-
ation with Africa in regard to infra-
structure development. In particu-
lar, building the capacity of Africa 
to diversify infrastructure funding 
through public–private partnerships 
is important.
 — Collaborate with key stakehold-
ers – such as the AfDB, AU and 
regional financial institutions – 
to encourage the development of 
market-driven modes of financing 
that will make infrastructure financ-
ing more transparent, efficient, com-
petitive and secure. This may involve 
building the pan-African capital 
market capabilities in order to raise 
funds for infrastructure in which 
continental Africa, the diaspora, the 
EU, China, the US and others can 
participate openly.
 — Encourage Africa’s transition 
towards clean and sustaina-
ble mobility. Leveraging the EU’s 
leadership and influence in order 
to push the global agenda and dis-
cussion on clean fuel- and fuel-ef-
ficient used car imports in order 
to challenge the status quo and 
make strides in following the Paris 
Agreement. Europe and North Africa 
are already cooperating on green 
hydrogen projects and expanding 
gas infrastructure and storage for 
hydrogen transport – the expansion 
of these initiatives to sub-Saha-
ran Africa will not only be essen-
tial for enhancing the transition to 
clean energy but will also have the 
potential for addressing Africa’s 
energy deficit. Europe could lever-
age its experience and expertise in 
urban development and become an 
important partner to Africa in urban 
mobility. Finally, supporting private 
sector involvement and partnership 
in sustainable mobility and climate 
change resilience, especially support 
in sensitising local innovations and 
solutions for climate-related prob-
lems, is important.
Collaborate with key stakeholders – 
such as the AfDB, AU and regional 
financial institutions – to encourage 
the development of market-driven 
modes of financing
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DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY refers to the in-
frastructure and services that transform 
society by fast and reliable access to 
people, data and the internet of things. 
While the growing and young population 
of Africa poses a demand for digital 
connectivity, the base of society has re-
mained largely unconnected for reasons 
such as pricing and irrelevant services. 
Finland, as a part of the EU, should focus 
its contribution on enhancing digital en-
trepreneurship, innovation and skills that 
empower Africans to use and co-design 
open digital services that foster their in-
clusive growth for their own good, liveli-
hood, and employment. Based on its own 
experience, expertise and narrative in dig-
ital connectivity, Finland can act beyond 
its actual size, together with African part-
ners co-building digital success stories, 
champions and models to be scaled up 
and mainstreamed regionally in line with 
the global strategies of the African Union, 
the World Bank, the EU, and the UN.
Summary
Finland can act beyond its actual 
size, together with African partners 
co-building digital success stories, 
champions and models to be scaled 
up and mainstreamed regionally in 
line with the global strategies.
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DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY combines the 
three processes of digitisation, digi-
talisation and digital transformation. 
Digitisation represents data and related 
services in a digital form, digitalisation 
integrates or connects the data and ser-
vices into everyday life, and digital trans-
formation refers to the way that individ-
uals’ lives and societies get transformed 
by the means of digital connectivity. Be-
sides connectivity, referring to the access 
of data by people and things, all the three 
aspects require advanced computational 
solutions, provided by data science, ma-
chine learning, artificial intelligence and 
the internet of things. In order to benefit 
people and make a positive difference 
at the grassroots of society, the three 
processes also need culturally relevant 
interaction design.
The current state of digital connec-
tivity in Africa can be portrayed from 
diverse perspectives. Box 1 illustrates 
the situation by the figures of mobile 
connectivity, based on the most recent 
report of the GSM Association (GSMA, 
2019).
Current 
understanding of 
digital connectivity 
in Africa
Digital connectivity combines the 
three processes of digitisation, digital-
isation and digital transformation. 
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DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: KEY FIGURES
Mobile coverage. Seventy per cent of the population in sub-Saharan Africa were covered by a 3G network in 2018 
(52% in 2014). The coverage of 4G increased from 9 per cent in 2014 to 34 per cent in 2018. In the Middle East 
and North Africa, the 3G coverage increased from 65 per cent in 2014 to 88 per cent in 2018, and 4G increased 
from 2 per cent to 58 per cent in the same time period. However, 150 million people in sub-Saharan African still 
lack even 2G coverage.
Mobile internet connections. The mobile internet penetration reached 24 per cent of the population in sub-Sa-
haran Africa by 2018 (worldwide 47%). However, while 30 per cent (worldwide: 10%) of the population in sub-Sa-
haran Africa were outside the reach of a mobile broadband network, 46 per cent (worldwide: 43%) of the popu-
lation could access a mobile broadband network but were not using it. In the Middle East and North Africa, the 
numbers were 40 per cent, 11 per cent and 49 per cent respectively.
Barriers for mobile internet use: factors and gaps within population. In Africa, the main factors hinder-
ing the use of mobile internet were lacking literacy and digital skills (34%), affordability (30%) and relevance 
(13%). The rural gap2 in sub-Saharan Africa is the highest in the world; however, it decreased from 65 per cent 
in 2014 to 58 per cent in 2018 (in the Middle East and North Africa it decreased from 39% to 36%; globally, it 
decreased from 46% to 40%). The gender gap3 in sub-Saharan Africa increased from 40 per cent  in 2017 to 41 
per cent in 2018 (in the Middle East and North Africa it decreased from 19% to 20%; the decrease in South Asia 
was from 67% to 58%; globally, it decreased from 5% to 4%). 
Costs (in 2018). For the lower income quintile, 1 GB of data costs 39.3 per cent of the monthly GDP in sub-Sa-
haran Africa and 8.2 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa. For the whole populations, the figures are 6.8 
per cent and 1.6 per cent respectively. For high income countries, the average is less than 1 per cent. For the 
lower income quintile, an entry-level internet-enabled device costs 375 per cent of the monthly GDP in sub-Saha-
ran Africa and 96 per cent in the Middle East and North Africa. For the whole populations, the figures are 69 per 
cent and 22 per cent respectively. For high income countries, the average is around 5 per cent.
Mobile connectivity index (2018). The GSMA has devised a mobile connectivity index to measure countries’ 
performance in mobile internet use by considering four key enablers: infrastructure, affordability, consumer 
readiness, and content and services. The index categorises countries into advanced, transitioners, emerging and 
discoverers. In Africa, Mauritius is the only advanced country on this index, whereas Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, 
Libya, Algeria, Ghana, Capo Verde and Kenya belong to transitioners. Ghana and Kenya joined the transitioners 
in 2018, whereas Benin, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia have moved from discoverers to emerging countries since 
2017. Globally, Chad has the lowest score on the index. In addition, Mauritius, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Kenya, 
Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire, Tanzania, Benin and Sierra Leone have advanced most compared to their score on the index 
since 2014. In sub-Saharan Africa, statistics from 2014 to 2018 indicates progress by all the enablers, as shown 
in Table 1.
2  The rural gap is defined as 
 
3  The gender gap is defined as 
1 - mobile internet adoption in rural areas 
mobile internet adoption in urban areas
1 - mobile internet adoption by females 
mobile internet adoption by males
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TABLE 1. INDICATORS OF THE DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY PROGRESS IN 2014–2018  
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA ON THE GSMA MOBILE CONNECTIVITY INDEX.
Key enabler Indicator 2014 2018
Infrastructure Mobile internet penetration 13% 24%
3G population coverage 52% 70%
4G population coverage 9% 34%
Average download speeds 2.5 Mbps 7.2 Mbps
Affordability Average monthly cost of 1 GB of data (of 
monthly GDP)
13.2% 6.8%
Average cost of entry-level internet-en-
abled device (of monthly GDP)
63.2% 68.5%
Consumer  
readiness
Adult literacy 63%
Average expected years of schooling 10.6 years
Mobile ownership 38% 45%
Content and  
services
Mobile social media penetration 5% 11%
Online service index score for e-gov-
ernment
21% 40%
Reality. During the 2020 lockdown in Namibia, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, less than 2 per cent of pupils had 
access to online education (Iikela, 2020). At the same time, the number of mobile subscriptions is more than 
100 per cent and over half of the population is using the internet according to the World Bank statistics from 
2018. The plain numbers concretise the contrast between the potential and reality of digital connectivity when it 
comes to its functional use. Beyond the quantity, the question of the 2 per cent relates to the quality of the con-
tent services that pupils have access to: what kind of education is available online? How does it prepare them for 
future society, requiring the 21st century skills? Memorising the multiplication table will not suffice.
The needs for digital connectivity in Af-
rica are best portrayed in the four recent 
global strategies (2019, 2020) based on 
analyses of available data, trends and po-
litical priorities. They commonly identify 
a set of key pillars of digital connectivity, 
integrated with focus areas and princi-
ples that should guide the digital connec-
tivity for transformation. The guidelines 
reflect upon those identified as Princi-
ples for Digital Development (Principles 
for Digital Development, n.d.) in a 10+ 
year process between international do-
nors, international organisations and the 
corporate sector. The principles are: de-
sign with the user; understand the exist-
ing ecosystem; design for scale; build for 
sustainability; be data driven; use open 
standards, open data, open source and 
open innovation; reuse and improve; ad-
dress privacy and security; and be collab-
orative. The key strategies are as follows: 
1. The World Bank’s Digital Economy 
for Africa (DE4A) Initiative (World 
Bank, 2019) has identified five 
pillars: digital infrastructure, 
digital platforms, digital financial 
services, digital entrepreneurship 
and digital skills. Following the five 
principles of comprehensiveness, 
transformation, inclusion, 
homegrown-ness and collaboration, 
the pillars are particularly expected 
to strengthen e-governance 
applications, e-commerce, open 
banking by non-banks offering 
tailored services and data lockers 
for accessing selected services. 
2. The EU-AU Digital Economy Task 
Force’s report (EU-AU Digital 
Economy Task Force, 2019) 
CONNECTING AFRICA – DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY 47
focuses on four goals that can 
be summarised as access to 
affordable broadband connectivity 
and digital infrastructure, digital 
skills, digital entrepreneurship and 
e-services in application areas such 
as finance government services, 
commerce and health.
3. The Digital Transformation Strategy 
for Africa (2020–2030) (African 
Union, 2020), approved by the AU in 
May 2020, is based on the interplay 
of founding pillars, critical sectors 
and cross-cutting themes. The five 
foundation pillars are enabling 
environment, policy and regulation, 
digital infrastructure, digital skills 
and human capacity, and digital 
innovation and entrepreneurship. 
The focus of the transformation is 
on the six critical sectors of digital 
industry, digital trade and financial 
services, digital government, 
digital education, digital health 
TABLE 2. THE PILLARS OF DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY IN AFRICA AS IDENTIFIED IN THE RECENT KEY 
STRATEGIES OF THE WORLD BANK, THE AU, THE EU AND THE BROADBAND COMMISSION OF THE 
ITU AND UNESCO.
Pillar DE4A Digital Economy Task Force The Digital Transformation  
Strategy for Africa
World Bank, 2019 EU-AU, 2019 African Union, 2020
Digital infrastructure
✓ ✓ 
(focuses on affordable  
access)
✓
Digital platforms
✓ ✓ 
(focuses on e-services for 
Sustainable Development 
Goals)
✓
Digital financial services
✓ ✓
Digital entrepreneurship
✓ ✓ ✓ 
(focuses on digital  
innovation)
Digital skills
✓ ✓ ✓  
(focuses on human capacity)
Policy and regulation
✓
During the 
2020 lockdown 
in Namibia, due 
to the COVID-19 
pandemic, less 
than 2 per cent 
of pupils had 
access to online 
education.
and digital agriculture. In all the 
sectors, the transformation takes 
place by integrating or fertilising 
them by technologies, activities 
or approaches that are called 
cross-cutting themes: digital 
content and applications, digital 
identity, emerging technologies, 
cybersecurity, privacy and personal 
data protection, and research and 
development. The values guiding 
the digital transformation are 
the principles of solidarity and 
cooperation, comprehensiveness, 
transformation, inclusion, 
homegrown-ness, a new mindset 
and safety.  
4. Connecting Africa through 
Broadband, a report by the 
Broadband Commission of the 
International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) and UNESCO 
(Broadband Commission, 2019), 
focuses on concrete examples.
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The following trends characterize digital 
connectivity in Africa (Song, 2020a).
Infrastructure. Mobile subscriptions 
are stabilising whereas fixed connec-
tions are on the increase. Undersea 
cable connections are developing fast, 
and countries are better connected to 
each other by terrestrial cables. Es-
pecially in remote rural areas, local, 
WiFi-based mobile operators have op-
portunities. Satellites also offer more 
connections. In regard to 5G, interest-
ingly, even in the newest documents, 5G 
only gets marginal attention (if it gets 
any attention). The opportunities of 5G 
are related to (1) supporting the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution and thus needed 
in the advanced research, development 
and innovation pockets, (2) improving 
digital connectivity in business hubs 
or (3) implementing WiFi-based local 
mobile networks for densely populated 
poor areas. However, currently only 10 
per cent of the 4G network’s capacity is 
used (Gilbert, 2020). As an impact of 
the trends, division between the haves 
and have-nots gets wider and deeper.4
Platforms. Content services seem to not 
be based on the poor population’s needs 
but on the demand of affluent consum-
ers: instead of rescue food, the digital 
4  On Steve Song’s informed website (Song, 2020b) he is very critical of the costs related to setting up 5G networks as they only widen the gap between the haves 
and have nots by serving a very narrow clientele. He strongly suggests that efforts should be focused on open radio access networks that would pave the way for a 
diversity of service providers to serve rural and marginalised populations.
platforms show the way to nice restau-
rants. Open governmental data is pro-
vided more generally, which is a critical 
factor for transparency and the design 
of a range of digital consumer services. 
Financial services. Digital innova-
tions born in Africa, such as mobile 
money and pay-as-you-go-solar (Ade-
goke, 2019), or PAYGo (‘Pay-as-you-go 
Approaches (PAYGO),’ n.d.), lead to the 
transformation of and access to financial 
services, including access for people who 
do not have traditional bank accounts or 
loan credibility. 
Entrepreneurship and innovation. In-
novation hubs and startup communities 
are expanding, especially in Nigeria, 
Eastern Africa and South Africa. 
Skills. Because of the wide variance in 
the quality and relevance of training 
offerings in digital skills, whether in 
formal or informal education, digitali-
sation causes disconnectivity or sepa-
ration rather than connectivity. The of-
ficial emphasis on the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution rather than on consumer-ori-
ented digitalisation might cause a bias 
towards professional skills rather than 
everyday skills.
Policy and regulation. Governments are 
making money by spectrum auctions, 
paving the way to monopolies and, thus, 
higher prices for connectivity. Areas with 
people who cannot pay for connectivity 
remain unconnected, causing emerging 
tensions between the urban areas and the 
remote rural areas. Increasing satellite 
connections start to divide the African 
sky, reminding of the colonial Partition 
of Africa on the ground.
NIGERIAN TEENS MAKING 3D SCI-FI FILMS
The case of Nigerian teens (Kottke, 2019) making use of smartphones and a Belgian online suite for 3D crea-
tion is a prime example of a functional integration of the aspects in Table 2. The teens created and produced 3D 
sci-fi films in their neighbourhood by a working internet connection (infrastructure) that gives them access to 
a European online platform (blender.org) that allows them to run their digital enterprise with which they can, 
quite naturally, utilise and develop their digital skills further. Getting their movies onto the market and earning 
income requires digital finance services that are regulated by policies, as are intellectual property rights (IPRs), 
privacy and other issues. Another example, from Ghana, shows how digital connectivity can transform the fash-
ion design and marketing scene (Barnes, 2020).
As an impact 
of the trends, 
division 
between the 
haves and 
have-nots gets 
wider and 
deeper.
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PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDE regulations and 
policies for digital connectivity are based 
on values. Table 3 shows the interdepend-
ency between values and the promotion 
of certain types of activities rooted in 
regulation and policies.
The policy and 
investment 
environment of 
digital connectivity
TABLE 3. VALUES ARE BASES FOR PRINCIPLES THAT ARE MATERIALISED  
IN LEGISLATION AND POLICIES FOR DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY.
Value Principle Law or regulation Policy or incentive Counter example
Inclusive (digital) 
growth
Doughnut economics IPRs Support for home-
grown innovations
Profits made from exclusive, for-
eign-owned services
Social (digital) cohe-
sion
Affordable access to 
the internet in order 
to avoid digital seg-
regation
Spectrum rights 
The taxation of 
services and equip-
ment
Support for devel-
oping standards and 
technologies for open 
networks
Investment in 5G at the cost of 
poor consumers’ connectivity
Human (digital) rights Free digital expres-
sion
Digital privacy Promoting digital 
skills
Limited access to governmental 
data 
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Among the legislation and policies shown 
in Table 3, the taxation of digital tech-
nology and services poses challenges to 
the use of existing digital connectivity. 
For example, the Information Technology 
Agreement (World Trade Organization, 
n.d.) requires each participant to elim-
inate and bind customs duties at zero 
for all products specified in the agree-
ment, but it has not been accepted in 
several African countries. The Universal 
Service and Access Fund (USAF) (Thakur 
& Potter, 2018), aimed at balancing the 
gender gap in making use of digital con-
nectivity, is underused across Africa. The 
taxation of foreign internet companies, 
for example, in Kenya, might lead to less 
use of their services.
Regarding the legislation for e-com-
merce, a key factor referred to in each of 
the strategies, there is significant var-
iance between regions in Africa, espe-
cially for e-transactions and cybercrime, 
with North Africa a clear leader. At the 
same time, West Africa leads in legisla-
tion which is more related to defending 
individuals: consumer protection and pri-
vacy legislation (African Union, 2020).
DISTRIBUTED AUTONOMOUS ORGANISATIONS OFFER 
DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY FOR THE SHARED ECONOMY
Distributed autonomous organisations (DAOs) provide a novel model 
for businesses where the profit is made by a diverse team. Each con-
tributor’s input is transparent and can be followed by block chain 
technology. A DAO requires relevant regulations that offer incen-
tives and a reasonable taxation policy for informal businesses (say, 
a street kitchen using locally sourced ingredients, grown in a poor 
suburb) to use smart technology in order to integrate with a larger, 
formal ecosystem.
Africa–China collaboration 
in digital connectivity
A recent summary (Gong, Gu, & Teng, 
2019) has made use of Chinese sources 
for identifying aspects of Africa–China 
collaboration in digital connectivity. The 
report’s findings are collected in Table 4. 
They show how the Chinese collaboration 
has been very comprehensive, or as Sec-
retary General Guterres mentioned, China 
targets connectivity ‘among the peoples’. 
The digital silk road of the BRI has been in-
tegrated with the 2030 Agenda for Sustain-
able Development in a way that is concre-
tised in local contexts with stakeholders.
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Digital connectivity is essential for people working at the iHub innovation centre in Nairobi, Kenya.
CONNECTING AFRICA – DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY 51
TABLE 4. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AS PROMOTED BY CHINESE PARTNERS (GONG ET AL., 2019).
Aspects of digital 
connectivity
Example
Infrastructure There has been some Chinese government involvement, especially in cross-border digital infrastructure and colla-
boration with the ITU and regional communities (such as the East African Community for building information 
highways). Huawei has built more than 50,000 km of optical cables in more than 50 countries and more than 50% 
of the wireless towers in Africa. In Tanzania, China Telecom supported Tanzania in building a key optical cable 
network that has made Tanzania one of the digital hubs of East Africa while reducing consumer prices.
Platforms Extending solutions that work in Chinese developing contexts to the rest of the Global South.
Financial  
services
Chinese financial services, like Alipay, are used to operate in contexts with low credit.
Entrepreneurship 
and innovation
Private companies have extensive R&D centre networks in Africa. The risk-prone approach of private investors en-
couraged them to work in settings where they were challenged by media or civil society.
Skills A major investment in training, capacity building and South–South collaboration. There has been extensive trai-
ning by private Chinese companies, like the Inspur group, related to learning Chinese best practices on the ground 
(Egypt, South Africa, Zimbabwe). Huawei runs a global talents training programme.
Policy and  
regulations
Using spatial information systems to monitor the adherence to regulations.
While the China–Africa collaboration is 
based on the BRI initiative and its inte-
gration into Agenda 2030, most of the 
concrete activities have been carried 
out by private Chinese companies. This 
might be partly due to the social obliga-
tions of Chinese enterprises. The Chinese 
government has mostly been involved in 
funding digital infrastructure, which has 
required significantly less money than 
similar investment in other infrastruc-
ture, like energy or transport infrastruc-
ture. In fact, the Chinese investment, by 
2017, in digital infrastructure was 0.1 per 
cent of its total foreign investment in in-
frastructure.
Compared to the EU’s or any Global 
North partner’s collaboration with Af-
rica, China has the advantage of being 
a Southern partner, applying solutions 
that already work at home in a develop-
ing context, supported by local commu-
nities and stakeholders, rather than ad-
vocating theoretical or inspiring models. 
While the EU is promoting its role as the 
world leader in technologies, models, 
standards and policies (European Union, 
2020) that are to be adopted or followed 
by the rest of the world, China has only 
recently found out its pioneering role in 
technology. Hence, it has even been able 
to take an intermediary role, in an inter-
section of the designer and user commu-
nities, to integrate or root its own, home-
grown solutions in Africa, validating their 
transformative power by the societal 
success stories made possible by tech-
nology. Through its position, it has been 
able to find its natural role in complex 
multi-partner consortia. For example, in 
2017, the Chinese Inspur Group launched 
an alliance with Cisco, IBM, Diebold and 
Ericsson with the Export–Import Bank 
of China, China Development Bank, the 
China Export & Credit Insurance Corpo-
ration and the China–Africa Development 
Fund in order to set up state-of-the-art 
data centres for cloud services and solu-
tions demanded by smart cities and 
smart enterprises. To sum up, while the 
EU calls on Africa to follow up and maybe 
behind, China is busy selling their solu-
tions and influence to make a difference, 
or at least to fix the problem. 
While the ethos of China’s digital 
connectivity initiatives in Africa is inte-
grated into sustainability as addressed 
in Agenda 2030, it is interesting to ana-
lyse the Chinese interventions, especially 
from the viewpoint of their interest in 
promoting open administration by spa-
tial information systems. While the sys-
tems can apply the most advanced AI 
technologies to analyse spatially coded 
data in order to alert about challenges 
on the ground – events compromising 
the sustainable environment, economy 
or culture – the analysis of these data 
can compromise the ethical dimension 
(Heinonen, 2014) of sustainability. For 
example, collecting and analysing the 
data of people’s movements in an urban 
setting might help in designing an eco-
logical environment, decreasing com-
muting costs and guiding people’s be-
haviour in a culturally appropriate way, 
but the system can also invade people’s 
privacy and encourage unnecessary con-
trol. Thus, collecting and analysing the 
data can take place at the cost of digital 
human rights. However, the ownership, 
confidence and transparency of the data 
are key ethical issues to tackle and they 
require co-design approaches when de-
signing digital connectivity with all the 
stakeholders at the levels of digital plat-
forms, financial services, innovations, 
skills and regulations.
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THE SECTION IS organised by Table 2. We 
identify the challenges where Finland, 
independently but also as a pioneer 
within the EU, is able to make a signif-
icant contribution.5 While Finland is a 
member state of the EU, it channels part 
of its support to digital connectivity in 
Africa via the EU6; we do not take stand 
on this. We focus on the concrete actions 
of Finland that will open up novel appli-
cations and materialisations of digital 
5  For example, in the earlier bilateral information society programmes with South Africa, such as COFISA and SAFIPA, Finland assumed a pioneering role in sup-
porting concrete initiatives in science, technology and innovation as an example of what the EU can mainstream as EU–South Africa programmes with the EU’s more 
extensive funds.
6  For example, related to digital skills, Finland contributes to the implementation of EU–Africa Strategic Partnership no 8 (STI, Information Society & Space) by 
investing in the strategic flagship project ALICT (Global e-Schools and Communities Initiative, n.d.) which trained a new cadre of policymakers and officials in inno-
vation policy and strategy. As another example, for digital infrastructure, the EU co-funds the AfricaConnect research network (https://www.africaconnect3.net/) and 
its integration to the European GÉANT network. 
connectivity. The challenges and related 
recommended actions will be based on 
the following criteria:
1. Finland has expertise, strengths 
and success in related areas of 
digital connectivity from Finland. 
2. Finland has experiences gained 
from earlier, related projects in 
information society, innovation, 
science and technology in Africa 
that can be scaled up for the whole 
continent.
3. Finland shares the values of the 
guiding principles identified in 
the relevant documents of the AU, 
EU, World Bank, and Broadband 
Commission.
4. Finland is a better fit for the 
challenges than other actors, 
organisations or agencies.
Recommendations 
for Finland and 
the EU related to 
supporting digital 
connectivity 
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Based on inclusion criterion 1, Finland is 
able to re-contextualise and rethink the 
models and practices that have led to the 
transformation of the Finnish civil soci-
ety, or citizen society, by the brave, inno-
vative, comprehensive and economically 
viable application of digital connectivity 
in sectors such as education; digital in-
dustry in emerging, globally demanded 
areas like games and cybersecurity; and 
e-governance (like payer-friendly taxa-
tion services). As a country with harsh 
nature, a small and aging population and 
vast rural areas, Finland has excelled in 
frugal innovation7 in order to turn the 
few resources into sustainable wealth. 
Because of their home, far from Euro-
pean cultural hubs, Finns have tradition-
ally championed homegrown, pragmatic 
inventions and been open to unconven-
tional, heritage-independent solutions 
and crafts.
Regarding inclusion criterion 2, it is 
critical to root Finland’s future contribu-
tions to digital connectivity in Finland’s 
recognised, long-term presence in Africa 
for an innovative and inclusive knowl-
edge economy to grow. Lessons learned 
and networks built within various innova-
tion and entrepreneurship programmes 
focused on digital technologies – such 
as COFISA, SAFIPA, TANZICT, STIFIMO, 
BIOFISA and SAIS – will pave the way 
for future collaboration at bilateral and 
multilateral levels.
Based on the value-based criterion 
3, it is easy for Finland to agree with 
the World Bank’s principles of compre-
hensiveness, transformation, inclusion, 
homegrown-ness, and collaboration, 
which the AU’s strategy for digital trans-
formation has complemented with sol-
idarity, new mindset and safety. These 
can be summarised as focusing digital 
connectivity to the have-nots in a way 
that empowers them to join in as the 
co-designers and entrepreneurs of digi-
tal solutions within a set of living labs in 
real-life settings. The principle of human 
rights, including digital rights (Bachelet, 
2019) that allow everyone not only to ac-
cess digital services but also to express 
themselves by digital means, calls for 
co-design teams that consist of diverse 
7  Frugal innovation is pruned from unnecessary features (Mahmood, Kondis, & Stehli, 2014).
stakeholders from marginalised areas of 
society, whether geographically margin-
alised or otherwise marginalised.
Based on the exclusion criterion 4, we 
do not recommend that Finland commits 
its direct resources to the challenges of 
the digital infrastructure, digital plat-
forms or services, or to regulations or 
policies. This is because Finland, both 
independently and as a member of the 
EU, has other instruments by which to 
indirectly strengthen these aspects of 
digital connectivity in Africa (through 
its support to the World Bank or AfDB). 
In addition, organisations like the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) and the ITU are already provid-
ing expertise for the policy and regula-
tion aspects that are anyway fully leg-
islated by the individual governments. 
However, regarding the design of individ-
ual online services or platforms, Finland 
should support a selection of inventive 
flagship activities that enhance digital 
skills and are initiated and maintained by 
local entrepreneurs, possibly with Finn-
ish or European co-owners. It is essential 
that the services designed and developed 
are sustainable for local use but also up-
scalable from the outset.
Based on the analysis above, we rec-
ommend that Finland focuses its efforts 
on releasing the potential of digital con-
nectivity by strengthening digital en-
trepreneurship and digital skills within 
innovative, inclusive and pragmatic in-
terventions that take place with a selec-
tion of communities at the grassroots 
level. By functional arrangements and 
a relevant concept design, these efforts 
will lead to upscalable and sustainable 
solutions led by empowered and brave 
champions, instead of reducing to indi-
vidual projects that will die with the end 
of funding.
In practice, the Finnish contribu-
tion for releasing the potential of dig-
ital connectivity, or operationalising 
the affordances of digital connectiv-
ity, should happen in digital entrepre-
neurship and innovation, digital skills 
and, to an extent, in RDI in open net-
works, their technologies, standards 
and services. 
Regarding digital entrepreneurship 
and innovation, lessons learned from ear-
lier Finnish-funded projects at bilateral 
and regional levels should be extended 
further. The measures require, for exam-
ple, supporting innovation competitions 
We recommend that Finland 
focuses its efforts on releasing the 
potential of digital connectivity 
by strengthening digital entrepre-
neurship and digital skills within 
innovative, inclusive and pragmatic 
interventions that take place with 
a selection of communities at the 
grassroots level.
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at local and regional levels in order to 
strengthen the pipeline of early-stage 
innovation that includes the following: 
 — Enabling a set of African consortia 
that consist of business, academia, 
non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and governmental stakehold-
ers that can co-design a solution for 
a given challenge with people in a 
network of interconnected real-life 
settings from different countries. A 
rural example is to design a func-
tional application for affordable 
KaiOS phones to improve the life-
cycle of subsistence farming across 
Africa. A sample suburban exercise 
is to design a set of services on a 
local mobile network that makes use 
of WiFi connections.
 — The criteria for selection are based 
on the promise of stakeholders’ prior 
ideas, the sustainability aimed for 
and the commitment of people in 
the real-life settings. Since the way 
from idea to implementation is long, 
the idea will be nurtured into a pro-
totype with other financiers through 
validation and subsequent initial 
deployment.
8  The Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs funded SAIS Connected Hubs of the SAIS 2 programme has been doing this with local Southern African tech hubs and 
Slush (https://vc4a.com/sais/connected-hubs-boostup/). It is interesting to observe that there is a student-led independent initiative of the Nordic–African Ambi-
tious Africa network (www.ambitious.africa) that aims ‘to initiate and support Nordic and African youth-led large-scale grassroots projects with social impact in 
Africa’. 
 — For the innovativeness and sustaina-
bility of the selected consortia, Finn-
ish lessons learned from successful 
start-ups, enterprises founded by 
young people, and novel design and 
prototyping models, such as agile 
software development and hacka-
thons, need to be contextualized for 
African settings, with African peo-
ple.8
Regarding digital skills, Finland is in a 
good position to devise functional and 
upscalable methods for learning digital 
skills in context, for example, following 
learning-by-doing or phenomenon-based 
pedagogies. The COVID-19 pandemic 
A EUROPEAN PLUG-IN CAMPUS
Recently, the University of Turku set up its first overseas 
campus (ftlab.utu.fi) in Africa. The Future Tech Lab expects 
to host African and European young people and companies 
in order to co-design solutions that make use of improving 
digital connectivity. The plug-in campus is an upscalable 
concept that brings academia to a real-life setting by using 
new remote presence technology that uses a reasonably broad 
connection (100 Mbps) to build an experience of shared real-
ity between two physically remote places. The plug-in campus 
with remote presence brings RDI activities to the ground and 
renews the way that academia can solve challenges at the 
grassroots level.
Finland should consider opening an African RDI lab 
co-designing technologies, standards and services 
for open networks. A fast-evolving landscape of 
consumers in suburban and rural settings creates huge 
potential for novel solutions aimed at vulnerable and 
marginalised groups.
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has shown that digital skills are easy to 
learn at the time of acute or authentic 
demand, in real contexts. Rather than 
integrated into formal education, digital 
skills should be learned in informal and 
non-formal settings. This is also aligned 
with doughnut economics, applied to 
learning: digital skills are learned in 
context for innovations that aim at in-
clusive growth for everyone rather than in 
contextually elitist degree programmes. 
Learning digital skills on focused, short 
and intense courses with industry actors 
allows Finnish industry to set up their 
offshoring units in Africa. A scalable 
model for supporting digital skills is the 
plug-in campus of the University of Turku 
in Windhoek (ftlab.utu.fi).
Regarding RDI in open networks, Fin-
land should consider opening an African 
RDI lab co-designing technologies, stand-
ards and services for open networks. A 
fast-evolving landscape of consumers in 
suburban and rural settings creates huge 
potential for novel solutions aimed at vul-
nerable and marginalised groups. 
Finnish initiatives in enhancing 
digital entrepreneurship and inno-
vation, digital skills and novel solu-
tions for open networks will ensure a 
9  There is extensive evidence of China and the US competing for influence in their operations in Africa. With its recent support of Africa in the COVID-19 pandemic, 
China referred to the importance of positive news in the media, which are more frequent in state-controlled media in one-party countries than in multiparty democra-
cies. A 5G based broadband would advance the positive news even faster (Harding, 2020).
focused and affordable transforma-
tion through digital connectivity that 
is based on demand. The following 
perspectives shall be kept in mind: 
 — Feedback loops. The feedback, expe-
riences and suggestions from the 
initiatives need to be based on data 
collected. Evidence-based sugges-
tions are to be communicated to (1) 
the policymakers and regulators of 
individual governments, the AU and 
other institutions at the continental 
level and (2) the operators of the 
digital infrastructure.
 — Mobility programmes. Existing 
Finnish and European mobility 
programmes need to be aligned 
for a European–African experi-
ence exchange so that participants 
can work in the real-life settings 
described above.
 — An entrepreneurship focus. Mobil-
ity programmes need to facilitate 
setting up joint business ventures 
between Finnish and African owners. 
More Finnish people are needed in 
Africa.
 — African orientation. An African 
mindset and values, as expressed 
in the Ubuntu philosophy, are inte-
grated to the initiatives.
The recommendations aim at Finland 
offering collaboration with Africa at the 
level of digital connectivity improving 
life in civil society, in a way that is com-
plementary to that of the Chinese or US 
approaches. While China is extending 
its comprehensive BRI programme to 
Africa to expand its political influence9 
and trade, and the US private sector is 
providing Africa with increasingly broad 
connections, assumingly also for access 
to global data, the Finnish and European 
approach should start from the demands 
of African people and societies. As there 
are unexpectedly fast success stories of 
innovative companies that make func-
tional uses of digital connectivity, it is 
fair to presume that collaboration at the 
grassroots level in Africa will result in 
inventions that will also lead to economic 
benefits for Finland and Europe in the 
foreseeable future.
It is fair to presume that collaboration at the 
grassroots level in Africa will result in inven-
tions that will also lead to economic benefits for 
Finland and Europe in the foreseeable future.
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TO DEAL WITH THE complex challenges 
in Africa, research and innovation ac-
tivities must be efficiently harnessed. 
Supporters and partners from outside 
the continent are necessary in order to 
add to and complement the internal re-
sources. These connections have consid-
erably increased during the recent years. 
They have also become more varied due 
to heightened interests of new partner 
countries and the private sector of the 
Global North. 
The inherent intricacy of questions 
related to science, technology, inno-
vation and higher education calls for 
in-depth knowledge and understand-
ing of the field. A key to future success 
lies in widely strengthening the related 
human resources and capacity, from the 
top down to the grassroots level. There 
is a largely shared consensus that the 
technological solutions for most of the 
African challenges exist already. What 
matters is how these solutions will be 
adapted, adopted and efficiently put into 
use to improve welfare and sustainabil-
ity. Here, institutional and organisational 
capacities and innovative solutions are 
the key for policymaking, business and 
local communities. 
Africa will long remain the most 
youthful continent, with vibrant 
entrepreneurship and culture. People are 
its key asset. We conclude that the most 
important contribution to the African 
research and innovation communities, 
from the outside, is to facilitate build-
ing a solid knowledge base on policies 
and practices that support the inclusive 
and sustainable development of African 
local communities. These efforts would 
preferably most often take place in in-
terdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, transna-
tional networks.
Summary
Institutional 
and organiza-
tional capacities 
and innovative 
solutions are  
the key.
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FOSTERING POVERTY reduction, job 
creation, sustainable livelihoods and 
improved welfare sets a tremendous 
challenge for African research and in-
novation activities (cf. NEPAD, 2014). 
During recent decades, many nations 
around the world have been able to in-
crease their level of prosperity based on 
a knowledge-driven strategy. There is 
indeed a correlation between a nation’s 
innovativeness and competitiveness (UN 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2016, 
pp. 4–5). Nevertheless, economic growth 
alone is not sufficient to solve the prob-
lems of welfare and sustainability, as the 
United Nation’s Sustainable Development 
Goals remind us. Wicked problems are 
only to be solved through means provided 
by science, technology and innovation. 
Furthermore, there is mounting research 
evidence showing that, for the success of 
sustainability transitions in developing 
countries, experiments in which develop-
ing countries engage with transnational 
networks and infrastructures to gain ac-
cess to various resources and markets 
are especially important (see Wieczorek 
[2018] for a large meta-analysis). Thus, 
connectivity is the key.
Current 
understanding 
of research 
and innovation 
connectivity in 
Africa
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Higher education is a case in point. 
International support for higher educa-
tion and research in Africa has mostly 
taken place through the funding of joint 
research projects, fellowships and grants 
for African students to study abroad and 
through the direct support of organisa-
tions like the AU and the Association of 
African Universities (AAU).  
And indeed, in the African context it 
is important to embrace a broad con-
cept of innovation. We can elucidate this 
by identifying two simplified modes of 
innovation (Jensen et al., 2007). The 
Science–Technology–Innovation (STI) 
mode rests on developing advanced re-
search and technology then applied to 
practical needs. The DUI (doing–using–
interacting) mode builds on everyday 
needs and activities and draws on learn-
ing by doing, using technology and in-
teracting between various actors pos-
sessing different types of practical and 
indigenous knowledge. The latter mode 
is less known, weakly captured by official 
statistics and, consequently, poorly un-
derstood and included in formal strate-
gies (cf. Daniels, 2017). Yet successes in 
adopting technology to promote African 
welfare and sustainability are likely to 
follow from combining these two models.
To be successful, innovations do not 
necessarily need to represent high tech-
nological sophistication; instead, af-
fordability and ease of adoption and use 
may be much more important features 
(frugal innovations) in Africa. A com-
mon problem is a lack of incentives, and 
the lack of capability and connections in 
organisations that are relevant for gen-
erating, adopting and deploying useful 
knowledge, participating in global mar-
kets and attracting foreign investments. 
These all are closely related to a country’s 
educational level and scientific infra-
structure. Let us next study the existing 
data, mostly related to the mentioned 
STI model, especially as seen from the 
connectivity point of view.
Higher education
Firstly, higher education contribut-
ing to the human resources in Africa is 
a basis on which a great deal of devel-
opment capacity rests. There are close 
to 2000 HEIs in Africa. While there are 
a number of graduates from HEIs that 
become unemployed, there are short-
ages of skilled labour in the fields of en-
gineering, science, agriculture and health 
in particular (International Institute for 
Water and Environmental Engineering, 
2013; Montenegro & Patrinos, 2012; World 
Bank, 2007). This calls for an increased 
quantity and quality of graduates, created 
by investing in human resources and lab-
oratories, especially for the above-men-
tioned disciplines. Other means include 
fostering international collaboration to 
raise quality and improving links with 
employers to raise the relevance of ed-
ucation.
The number of HEIs has grown rapidly. 
More than half of these are private uni-
versities. Particularly significant among 
them is the proliferation of for-profit in-
stitutions, although religious ones are 
still important. However, the quality of 
higher education has not grown at the 
same pace. The student-to-teacher ratio, 
research capacity and basic infrastructure 
are serious concerns all over the conti-
nent. South African universities are the 
best performers in the 2020 Times Higher 
Education ranking: the country had 8 out 
of the 19 best universities in Africa.
For the success of sustainability transitions in devel-
oping countries, experiments in which developing 
countries engage with transnational networks and 
infrastructures to gain access to various resources and 
markets are especially important.
CONNECTING AFRICA – RESEARCH AND INNOVATION CONNECTIVITY62
The gross enrolment ratio of the rele-
vant age group in tertiary education is the 
lowest in the world: in 2018, it was 9 per 
cent in sub-Saharan Africa and 35 per cent 
in Northern Africa when the global average 
was 38 per cent (UIS.Stat, 2020). Thus, 
it is not surprising that Africans form the 
biggest and most rapidly growing group of 
internationally mobile students. The data 
available at the UNESCO Institute for Sta-
tistics (UIS), combined with the figures 
released by the Ministry of Education of 
China, suggest that the number of Afri-
cans studying abroad is close to 650,000, 
which represents about 11 per cent of the 
global number. 
The patterns of this mobility are 
changing with new countries emerging 
among the top destinations, most impor-
tantly China, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia 
(see Table 5). For instance, the Forum 
on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), as 
a framework for China’s wider economic 
interests in Africa, provides scholarships 
to African students. Also, big Chinese 
cities and universities have established 
regional and institutional scholarships 
for African students. Saudi Arabia, like 
other Gulf countries, is spreading its cul-
tural and political influence in Africa but 
also investing in the quality and rank-
ings of their own higher education and 
research by increasing the numbers of 
international students. Malaysia, in turn, 
is an example of a country that has con-
sciously developed its higher education 
sector with several international branch 
campuses in order for it to become an 
important source of export earnings. In-
teresting newcomers are Ukraine, Rus-
sia and Turkey. While Ukraine is another 
example of developing higher education 
as an industry, Russia and Turkey have 
strategic interests in Africa connected to 
educational cooperation.
North America and, to lesser extent, 
Australia and India remain important 
destinations for African students, but 
Europe is still on the top of the list, 
France and Germany in particular. Afri-
can students, however, are also an im-
port group of foreign students in smaller 
states as well. In Finland, for instance, 
they form 10 per cent of all foreign stu-
dents (Finnish National Agency for Edu-
cation. 2017). 
TABLE 5. AFRICAN STUDENT MOBILITY: EXAMPLES
 
Destination 2015 2017
World 563,840 559,073***
Europe 212,710 235,994
France 97,990 112,217
United Kingdom 34,924 29,900
Germany 19,063 23 641
Finland 2,271 2,050
Ukraine 9,806 13,154*
China** 49,792 81,562*
United States of America 40,990 46,013
Malaysia 25,802 28,132*
Saudi Arabia 22,485 22,418*
Canada 18,309 22,845
Turkey 9,125 14,282
India 10,684 11,295*
Australia 7,306 9,749
Russia 6,132 9,118
Intra-Africa 131,397 132,227
Northern Africa 22,813 25,893
South Africa 35,495 36,281
DATA EXTRACTED ON 07 MAY 2020 FROM UIS.STAT, ‘STATISTICAL REPORT ON 
INTERNATIONAL STUDENTS IN CHINA FOR 2018’, MOE.GOV.CN, APRIL 18, 2019, 
‘THE SINO-AFRICAN HIGHER EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE: HOW BIG IS IT AND WILL IT 
CONTINUE?’, MARCH 7, 2017
*2018; **HONG KONG AND MACAU NOT INCLUDED; ***EXCLUDING CHINA
The number of higher 
education institutions has 
grown rapidly.
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Differences between African countries 
are remarkable in regard to both the vol-
umes and destinations of mobile stu-
dents. France, for example, is most impor-
tant for francophone Africa. About 30,000 
Moroccan mobile students, 20,000 Alge-
rian mobile students and 10,000 Tunisian 
mobile students go to France. Germany, 
Canada, the US and the UK come far below. 
France is among the top destinations for 
Egyptian students too. For Northern Af-
rican students with skills in Arabic, the 
scholarships provided by Saudi Arabia are 
particularly lucrative. Chinese universi-
ties have reserved specific slots for stu-
dents from individual African countries 
like Ghana (Gu, 2017). The most common 
destinations of Ghanaian, Ethiopian, Ken-
yan and Nigerian students are the US and 
UK. The linguistic ties bring Angolan and 
Mozambican students to Portugal or Bra-
zil. Rwanda, in turn, sends most its mobile 
students to India. 
Within Africa, Egypt, Ghana, Morocco, 
Senegal and South Africa are the most 
popular host countries. Most of the mo-
bile students of the DRC, for instance, 
go to South Africa. South Africa, in turn, 
sends students to the US, the UK, Can-
ada and Australia. As the table shows, 
intra-African mobility is remarkable, 
however, there is potential for growth.
To enhance cooperation between Afri-
can Higher Education Institutions with 
a supportive partner from EU member 
states the African Union and the EU 
have initiated the Intra-Africa Academic 
Mobility Scheme. The scheme has been 
running since 2016 with a total budget 
of EUR 9.8 million allowing around 350 
mobility flows. One of the aims is the 
harmonisation of programmes and cur-
ricula within participating institutions.
However, the 
quality of higher 
education has 
not grown at the 
same pace.
CASE: THE EASTERN AFRICA UNIVERSITIES 
MATHEMATICS PROGRAMME (EAUMP) SUPPORTED 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE PROGRAMME 
(ISP) AT UPPSALA UNIVERSITY, SWEDEN. 
ISP cooperation, that already started in 1961, has been based on 
a ‘sandwich’ (PhD) model, where students from Africa get train-
ing partly at their home university and partly at a Swedish uni-
versity. The co-operation involves long-term collaboration and 
joint investments in research environments in Africa. Maintain-
ing the connections to the home university enhances research 
of local relevance and prevents brain drain. The ISP is funded 
by the Swedish government through the Swedish Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida). It has subprogrammes in physi-
cal sciences, chemical sciences and mathematics. The EAUMP, 
established in 2002, brings together the departments of Math-
ematics at the University of Nairobi, the University of Dar es 
Salaam, Makerere University in Uganda, the University of Rwanda 
and the University of Zambia. ISP support to EAUMP 2002–2016 
was EUR 2.99 M. According to an independent evaluation, in 
a short time the EAUMP has played a ‘transformative role’ in 
mathematics research and teaching capacity throughout Eastern 
Africa. In addition to postgraduate training, the objective is to 
strengthen the collaborating departments in terms of equipment 
and literature (International Science Programme, 2020).
Research and innovation
Regarding innovation activities, it is 
worth noting that the African economies 
are to a great extent based on informal 
economic activities (ILO, 2012). Like-
wise, informal innovation activities and 
learning in everyday activities (the DUI 
model discussed previously) represent 
a large majority of advances in African 
society. Therefore, data on R&D activities 
in African countries represents only the 
‘tip of the iceberg’ (cf. Kraemer-Mbula 
& Wamae, 2010). According to African 
Innovation Outlook III (AUDA-NEPAD, 
2019), there is not yet any reliable data 
to cover all the African countries. Nev-
ertheless, significant progress has been 
made in that direction by introducing Af-
rican science, technology and innovation 
indicators (ASTII) and by making efforts 
to harmonise survey methodologies. So 
far 26 countries have provided data for 
the latest compilation, only seven cov-
ering all the four sectors (private, gov-
ernment, higher education and private 
non-profit sectors) needed to calculate 
the gross expenditure on research and 
development (GERD).
Overall, Africa’s gross expenditure on 
R&D as a proportion of GDP can be es-
timated to stand at about 0.5 per cent. 
During 2016–2018, the share of GERD 
for sub-Saharan Africa was 0.38 per cent, 
for North Africa it was 0.61 per cent, for 
South Africa it was 0.82 per cent and for 
Egypt it was 0.72 per cent. The world av-
erage was 1.72 per cent (UIS, 2020).  
The higher education sector usually has 
the highest share of the national ‘cake’ 
of R&D spending. According to ASTII III 
(AUDA-NEPAD, 2019), this ranges from 
South Africa’s 28 per cent to Ethiopia’s 
74 per cent. Governments are usually 
also considerable performers of R&D, 
with spending ranging typically from 
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25 per cent to almost 50 per cent of the 
total GERD. Out of the seven countries 
with reliable data on all four sectors’ ex-
penditure, business expenditure on R&D 
(BERD) is only strong in South Africa 
where it stands at 0.34 per cent, though 
this is below the average among the 
OECD countries (1.67%). South African 
total expenditure for R&D (close to USD 7 
billion) is on about the same level as that 
of Finland, although South Africa has a 
ten times larger population than Finland.
Increasing R&D spending alone will 
not help. Innovation is about comple-
mentarities: to nurture a successful 
product or process needs management 
capacity and other human and organisa-
tional capital. A favourable innovation 
environment also calls for the relative 
ease and low cost of doing business, the 
protection and enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights and favourable trade 
policies, among many other things. On 
a local level, innovations must be born 
out of co-creation processes where their 
expected users are engaged from the be-
ginning. In other words, a truly systemic 
perspective on innovation and innovation 
policies is needed. An important call for 
innovation policies is to understand the 
complex nature of innovation, specifically 
in the African context (Daniels, 2017).
Concerning the African scientific and 
technological output (WIPO, 2019) the 
last two decades have indicated a rela-
tively high increase in terms of scientific 
publications (from 1.1% of the world total 
from 2000 to 2004 to 1.8% from 2015 to 
2017) whereas the share of patenting fell 
(from 0.3% of the world total from 2000 
to 2004 to 0.2% from 2015 to 2017). Pat-
enting shows a high concentration on a 
few countries in Africa, namely Egypt and 
South Africa. Since the 1970s, African col-
laboration with inventors outside of the 
continent has become more versatile: from 
domination by Western Europe it now also 
comprises the USA and China in particular.
The Global Innovation Index (GII; 
WIPO, 2019) states that ‘Africa shines in 
terms of innovation relative to level of 
development. Out of the 18 innovation 
achievers identified in the GII 2019, ’six 
(the most from any one region) are from 
the Sub-Saharan African region. Impor-
tantly, Kenya, Rwanda, Mozambique, Ma-
lawi and Madagascar stand out for being 
innovation achievers at least three times 
in the previous eight years’. Of the larger 
African countries, South Africa ranks as 
the 63rd, Morocco the 74th, Kenya the 77th, 
Egypt the 92nd, Tanzania the 97th, Ethio-
pia the 111th, Algeria the 113th and Nigeria 
the 114th. However, the Global Innovation 
Index 2019 (p. 3) report also states that 
‘Sub-Saharan Africa continues to have 
low levels of R&D investments compared 
to what other world regions spend’. It is 
important to note that GII indicators 
broadly comprise the various dimensions 
of innovation and creativity, as well as as-
pects of investments and infrastructure. 
Among African top innovation achievers, 
Kenya and Mozambique, for example, 
have scored well in categories related to 
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CASE: GLOBELICS – AN INTERNATIONAL 
SCHOLARLY ASSOCIATION FOR INNOVATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT
The Globelics research network connects the likeminded 
researchers around the world that are dedicated to improving 
understanding of how innovation and competence build links to 
economic development. Founded in 2002 by some of the most 
influential and renowned scholars of innovation studies, the 
network set its target of building research and policymaking 
capacity in the Global South. To date, more than 3000 scholars 
have attended Globelics conferences, organised in the Global 
South. In addition, there are more than 300 PhD students that 
have participated in the Globelics Academy. Globelics engages 
actively in dialogue with donor organisations, NGOs and the 
private sector, as well as policymakers, in order to find out how 
to best use and diffuse research findings and promote inclusive 
and sustainable development. From the beginning, Africa has 
had a special role in Globelics activities as the African commu-
nity of scholars in the research field back then was very small. 
The collaboration of the African community and Globelics has 
helped to change the situation (https://www.globelics.org/). 
cultural and creative industries. These are 
among the many industries that typically 
do not invest a lot in formal R&D, but 
their innovation patterns are less easily 
captured in statistics.
There has been a boom of the start-up 
culture in several entrepreneurial and 
innovative hotspots in Africa. In 2010, 
there were altogether only about USD 20 
million in VC investment to Africa, while 
nine years later, the estimation is that 
this figure will be as high as USD 1.5 bil-
lion. In parallell, there has been a boom 
of innovation hubs. A recent survey of the 
African hubs (Afrilabs & Briter Bridges, 
2019) found as many as 643 hubs, rang-
ing from co-working spaces, incubators 
and accelerators to those affiliated with 
governmental, university or corporate or-
ganisations. For these, affordable shared 
office space, fast internet connections 
and reliable electricity sources are crucial 
as these are still largely in short supply 
in Africa. Other important aspects are, 
of course, related to business develop-
ment: skills, networking and funding. 
The report identified 110 hubs that had 
discontinued their operations in recent 
years due to, for example, bankruptcy or 
the expiration of their mandate. There is 
as also a considerable variation between 
African countries. International inves-
tors and donors usually play an import-
ant role in many innovation hubs. For 
example, the large Afrilabs network of 
tech hubs is backed up by partnerships 
with European donor organisations and 
US corporations, such as Facebook and 
Microsoft. 
Entrepreneurship in general is key: as 
much as 22 per cent of the working-age 
population is starting a business in Af-
rica, which is the highest share among all 
the continents. However, approximately 
one third of these new ventures were ne-
cessity-driven, not based on a clear busi-
ness idea (African Development Bank 
Group, 2017). 
A recent survey conducted in ten Af-
rican countries indicated that approxi-
mately 59 per cent of the firms employ-
ing at least ten people were innovative, 
meaning that they had introduced new 
or significantly improved products, pro-
cesses, organisation and/or the market-
ing method during the last three years 
(African Innovation Outlook III, pp. 
110–111). The survey indicated that uni-
versities and public agencies were usu-
ally only important sources of innovation 
among less than 10 per cent of innova-
tive companies. Instead, customers and 
various kinds of suppliers, together with 
internal sources, were the most import-
ant. This shows that practical everyday 
activities (the DUI model) most often 
provokes ideas and provides information 
to come up with considerable changes in 
products and processes. 
A great majority of the value added 
that is generated in production chains 
occurs outside of Africa. As is well known, 
most of the natural resources produced 
in Africa are refined elsewhere or by for-
eign companies, hence providing only 
limited opportunities for African value 
added and innovativeness. Therefore, 
strengthening value added taking place 
in the African continent by African actors 
would have a powerful impact on African 
innovations.
Strengthening value added taking 
place in the African continent by 
African actors would have a powerful 
impact on African innovations.
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Policy and 
investment 
environment 
of research 
and innovation 
connectivity
IN 2006, the AU endorsed raising its 
member countries’ national budgets for 
science and technology to one per cent of 
the GDP. In 2015, the AU’s Science, Tech-
nology and Innovation Strategy for Africa 
2024 (STISA-2024) encouraged coun-
tries to ‘take concrete actions to allocate 
at least 1% of GDP to R&D to ensure that 
Africa maximizes ownership and respon-
sibility for its own developmental path’. 
As we saw in the previous section, this 
has not yet taken place in any of the 
African countries. External funding for 
formal R&D activities is important for 
many African countries. 
China’s R&D cooperation with African 
countries, measured as scientific co-au-
thorships, has considerably increased 
during the 2000s, and the biggest growth 
has only taken place after 2009. Collabo-
rative patenting, implying technological 
collaboration instead, has mostly been at 
a low level, partly explained by the over-
all low level of patenting activity in Africa 
(Muchie & Patra, 2019). Only a few Afri-
can countries collaborate intensively with 
China, South Africa, Egypt and Morocco 
in particular.
In higher education, the AU–EU part-
nership supports the Harmonisation of 
African Higher Education Quality As-
surance and Accreditation Initiative 
(HAQAA) in providing guidance for the 
general management of academic in-
stitutions and exchange between them. 
One important element in the provision 
of data concerns the volumes, resources 
and content of university teaching. The 
implementation of the first phase of 
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HAQAA involves the AAU and the Euro-
pean Association for Quality Assurance 
in Higher Education (ENQA) among oth-
ers.
Concerning Finland, the FinCEAL Plus 
Bridges programme supports research 
collaboration between Finland and Af-
rica. As far as innovation support is con-
cerned, the most important current offi-
cial programme is the Southern Africa 
Innovation Support Programme (SAIS, 
phase II) that covers Botswana, Namibia, 
South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The 
programme supports the growth of new 
businesses through strengthening inno-
vation ecosystems and cross-border col-
laboration. It also gives support to com-
petitively selected start-ups by business 
mentoring, product development and by 
linking the companies with investors. 
CASE: NTAKA, AN AFFORDABLE EXPERT ON SOIL 
HEALTH
A Zambian company, ntaka, one of the recipients of the grants 
awarded by the SAIS programme, is established to strengthen the 
effectiveness of scientific and technical soil expertise. The compa-
ny’s offering, including a mobile soil spectroscopic laboratory, is tar-
geted to a whole range of sub-Saharan farmers ranging from large-
scale commercial farmers to small-scale subsistence farmers. A wide 
range of expert services are provided by ntaka in order to reduce 
farming inputs and to improve the reliability of yields by increas-
ing an individual farmer’s understanding of his or her soil’s specific 
characteristics. This is increasingly important due to the climate 
change. The focal company is backed up by a transnational network 
of partners, including both academic expertise and competences in 
local grassroots engagement (https://ntaka.org/). 
Regarding the biggest EU research and 
innovation programme for 2014–2020, 
Horizon 2020, more than €123 million 
has been allocated to AU partners. The 
most active country is South Africa, fol-
lowed by Kenya, Tunisia, Morocco and 
Egypt. In 2019 African partners had par-
ticipated 617 times in 279 signed grants 
of collaborative Marie Skłodowska-Curie 
actions and European Research Council 
actions receiving 98.1 million euros of 
EU contribution while they contributed 
approximately 15 million euros; a total 
of 645 researchers with the nationality of 
an AU country had participated in MSCA 
actions (European Commission, 2019). 
The most important areas of these dif-
ferent kinds of partnerships are related 
to health and medicine, food and water, 
and security (ERAC/SFIC, 2020, p. 9).
Besides research collaboration, the EC 
launched the Africa–Europe Innovation 
Partnership in 2019. This initiative is 
meant to connect the African and Euro-
pean incubators and accelerators, foster 
technology transfer and build capacity, 
including that provided by African in-
novators’ and entrepreneurs’ access to 
capital. 
Overall, there is already a dense web 
of official African–European networks 
and programmes on STI. Besides the 
EC’s programmes, most of the European 
countries also maintain their own pro-
grammes with Africa. The SFIC Africa 
Task Force has recently highlighted the 
following constraints to Africa–Europe 
STI initiatives (ERAC/SFIC 2020; cf. Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015): 
 — the lack of joint funding mecha-
nisms
 — the lack of science councils in most 
African countries
 — challenges with the disbursement of 
STI funds once granted
 — missing links between science, tech-
nology and innovation policy and 
other domains
 — the low level of engagement between 
academia, the private sector and 
civil society/communities
 — low SME participation.
Based on their analysis of outcomes 
from several studies, Cherry et al. (2018, 
pp. 143–144) stated that the institutional 
framework of Africa–Europe STI collab-
oration needs a radical rethinking in 
order to come up with more innovative 
cooperative mechanisms. They also call 
for more commercially oriented fund-
ing models and a mindset that is more 
strongly directed towards outcomes.
Africa-Europe STI collaboration needs a more 
innovative cooperative mechanisms.
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION captures an 
essential viewpoint:
African countries […] need not to re-
invent the wheel. They can use existing 
technology to address their development 
challenges simply by building the capac-
ity to find, adapt and adopt mutually 
agreed-upon terms, and proven off-the-
shelf technology developed elsewhere. 
(Africa Sustainable Development Report, 
2018, p. 106; cf. UN STI Forum, 2019)
With a projected growth of population 
in Africa, the urgency of problems calls 
for policies of high impact. This means 
that, on the one hand, there is need for 
local human capacity everywhere in Af-
rica to work towards the goals of welfare 
and sustainability, requesting HEIs to 
respond to the most pressing societal 
needs. On the other hand, African re-
search do not have to dwell on a long and 
lonely journey in order to find answers to 
the continent’s tremendous challenges. 
Instead, research performers need to 
orientate research towards collaborating 
with civil society and the private sector. 
In addition, they should be able to seam-
lessly collaborate in transnational net-
works in order to conduct experiments 
for sustainable transitions in their coun-
tries.
For capacity building, sustained 
long-term institutional co-operation is 
Recommendations 
for Finland 
and the EU to 
support research 
and innovation 
connectivity 
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needed. We recommend the following 
aspects to be considered in particular: 
 — Europe must, for its part, ensure 
that the policy instruments in its 
African co-operation are focused 
on outcomes, have long-term com-
mitment and will form a coherent, 
impactful entity. Cross-sectoral and 
interdisciplinary problem-oriented 
programmes that target the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
should have priority. Programmes 
that integrate basic and applied 
research with concrete experiments 
on the grassroots level would help 
the crucial research outcomes to find 
their needy audience. 
 — International and intra-African net-
working and mobility for the quality 
of higher education and research 
training requires proceeding with the 
harmonisation of degrees and the 
collection of and access to accurate 
data on higher education in African 
countries.   
 — While academic communities are 
encouraged to collaborate with 
external stakeholders, their aca-
demic freedom must be safeguarded 
to guarantee that the scientific 
communities can voice their opin-
ions and find their own ways to col-
laborate.
 — In the sphere of STI and HEI poli-
cies, the capacity of policymakers 
and of policymaking bodies is of 
outmost importance due to the many 
complexities of the fields. Therefore, 
educating present and future policy-
makers to understand the intricacies 
of those fields of policy should be 
one of the key priorities. Policymak-
ers may or may not enable novel 
development.
Another important point to note is 
that even though many African countries 
aspire to focus on the growth of their 
manufacturing sector, services are not 
to be underestimated. To increase value 
added and productivity, many services 
have a crucial role to play, including 
those related to digitalisation and finan-
cial and business services. In addition, 
many of those services that can be digit-
ised, and thus sold over the internet, can 
themselves be high value-added exports. 
This includes those mentioned, as well as 
cultural and creative industries.
During the last ten years, many Af-
rican cities have witnessed a boom of 
start-ups and techno-entrepreneurs. 
Various kinds of innovation hubs have 
mushroomed around Africa. Increas-
ingly there are resources available for 
African scholars, innovators and grass-
roots movements. There are numerous 
ongoing experiments engaging the civil 
society. If anyone, bottom-up activities 
and local communities are the ones solv-
ing the African challenges.
Research and innovation connectivity 
in and with Africa has taken many steps 
during recent decades, along a growing 
recognition of Africa’s strategic impor-
tance, vibrant entrepreneurship and cul-
ture. Without inclusive and sustainable de-
velopment of African local communities 
there is a risk of losing this crucial field 
of collaboration into a realm of conflicting 
interests of the world powers while poverty, 
inequality, unemployment and environ-
mental hazards keeps mounting in Africa. 
We conclude that facilitating the 
knowledge base of policies and practices 
supporting the local level is also the best 
way to enhance the African research and 
innovation capacity for sustainable de-
velopment.
M
IKA KAU
TO
N
EN
Start-up pitching event in Windhoek, Namibia.
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THIS REPORT HAS discussed the possi-
bilities for improving Africa’s connectiv-
ity. It has shown that a lot remains to 
be done in order to better connect Af-
rican countries and Africans with each 
other and with the rest of the world in a 
sustainable and just manner. It has also 
shown positive trends that have been tak-
ing place in the past few decades. Invest-
ments into infrastructure, education and 
innovation are increasing. However, more 
investments are needed to keep up with 
the current pace of population growth. 
In all chapters in this report – whether 
referring to transport, energy, digitali-
sation or research and innovation – 
people-centeredness has been raised 
as being at the core. Any solution to 
enhance Africa’s connectivity has to be 
done by or with Africans, based on their 
will and needs. New innovations and dig-
ital solutions have to be co-created with 
the people who are affected by them and 
serve their inclusion in society. Energy 
investments have to spur Africa’s pri-
vate sector development, and electrifi-
cation has to reach people who currently 
lack access to electricity. Transport net-
works have to support people’s mobility, 
whether it is rural, urban or cross-border 
mobility. Human resources have to be 
strengthened through investments into 
higher education, research and innova-
tion.
In the energy sector, continued sup-
port for a sustainable transformation to 
a zero-carbon economy is needed. Invest-
ments into solar, wind, biomass, hydro 
and geothermal energy are still too few. 
For investments and support measures 
to be successful, they should support 
local employment, skills, operators, 
entrepreneurs and knowledge. Further-
more, as technology is developing fast, 
access to electricity plays a crucial role 
for inclusion in society. Increasing the 
electricity connectivity of the millions of 
Africans who live under the grid in grow-
ing urban areas is important. In addition 
to grid connectivity, decentralised, re-
newable energy-based off-grid solutions 
can be important for providing access 
to rural populations and to commercial 
actors who suffer from grid unreliability 
and use diesel-powered generators. All 
energy investments should be socially 
and environmentally sustainable. 
In terms of transport, there is a need 
to align the interests of the private sec-
tor and external stakeholders, such as 
the EU and Finland, with Africa’s regional 
and sub-regional transport infrastructure 
goals, like the Action Plan for Boosting 
Intra-African Trade. The EU’s external 
investment plan and the Africa–EU Alli-
ance provide an essential foundation for 
strengthening EU cooperation with Africa 
on infrastructure development. In par-
ticular, building the capacity of Africa to 
Any solution to enhance 
Africa’s connectivity has to be 
done by or with Africans, based 
on their will and needs.
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diversify infrastructure funding through 
Public Private Partnerships is important.
While the growing and young popula-
tion of Africa poses a demand for digital 
connectivity, the base of society has re-
mained largely unconnected, for reasons 
such as pricing and irrelevant services. 
Finland, as a part of the EU, should focus 
its contribution on enhancing digital en-
trepreneurship, innovation and skills 
that empower Africans to use and co-de-
sign digital services that foster inclusive 
growth for their own good, livelihood, and 
employment. Based on its own experi-
ence, expertise and narrative in digital 
connectivity, Finland can act beyond its 
actual size, co-building success stories, 
champions and models that can later be 
scaled up and mainstreamed by individ-
ual African governments, the corporate 
sectors and academia, linking them up 
with the strategies and principles of the 
AU, the World Bank, the EU and the ITU. 
Finally, to deal with the complex chal-
lenges in Africa, research and innova-
tion activities must be efficiently har-
nessed. A key to future success lies in 
widely strengthening related human re-
sources and capacity, from the top down 
to the grassroots level. There is a largely 
shared consensus that the technologi-
cal solutions for most of the African 
challenges already exist. What matters 
is how these solutions will be adapted, 
adopted and efficiently put into use in 
order to improve welfare and sustaina-
bility. The most important contribution 
to the African research and innovation 
communities, from the outside, is to fa-
cilitate building a solid knowledge base 
on policies and practices that support the 
inclusive and sustainable development 
of African communities. Africa will long 
remain the most youthful continent with 
vibrant entrepreneurship and culture. 
People are its key asset. 
The Covid-19 pandemic and 
connectivity
The work on this study started at the 
same time as the COVID-19 pandemic led 
to lockdowns across the world, includ-
ing Africa. We do not yet know what the 
world will look like when the pandemic is 
over and what its effects on Africa will be. 
What we do know, however, is that con-
nectivity is very much at the core of the 
pandemic and the way we look at connec-
tivity in the future will be heavily affected 
by COVID-19. It is useful to turn the les-
sons learned during the past months 
into opportunities for strengthening and 
transforming Africa’s connectivity. 
Apart from economic recession and 
its consequences, the trade balance 
will worsen, jobs and livelihoods will be 
lost, countries will face a debt crisis, 
inequalities will increase and political 
unrest might occur. The UN Economic 
Commission for Africa has predicted 
that the COVID-19 pandemic will cause 
a decline of Africa’s GDP, dropping from 
a projected 4.1 per cent to 1.1 per cent 
in the best-case scenario and to -2.6 
per cent in the worst-case scenario. The 
pandemic has caused falling demand 
for Africa’s commodities, capital flight 
and a virtual collapse of tourism and air 
transport due to lockdowns and border 
closures. The start of the African Conti-
nental Free Trade Area will be postponed 
from July 2020, which delays prospects 
for increased intra-African trade (UNECA, 
2020).
COVID-19 has brought the world’s 
digital divide to the surface. The sudden 
dependence on digital technology has 
created deeper inequality between the 
connected and the unconnected. Those 
with a fast broadband connection have 
been able to work, study, keep enter-
tained and stay connected to family and 
friends. It has kept people informed and 
employed. Those without access are at 
the risk of facing heavy economic and 
social distress. Online education has not 
even been a remote possibility for mil-
lions of unconnected children in Africa. 
Mobile connectivity, although faster to 
roll out, offers lower transmission rates 
than fixed networks. Furthermore, busi-
nesses in the informal economy have not 
necessarily had the capacity to digitalise 
their services and move into e-commerce 
It is useful to turn the lessons 
learned during the past 
months into opportunities 
for strengthening and trans-
forming Africa’s connectivity.
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or digital food delivery apps. In sub-Sa-
haran Africa one gigabit of data costs 
nearly 40 per cent of the average monthly 
wage (ITU/UNESCO, 2019). 
The pandemic has also shown that 
access to health care is a pressing prob-
lem in African countries. Even in health 
care, connectivity is an obstacle. Only 34 
per cent of hospitals have reliable elec-
tricity access and about 58 per cent of 
health facilities have no electricity at 
all (UNEP, 2017). Health centres mainly 
rely on unreliable grid electricity or die-
sel-based generators. This means, for ex-
ample, that where there are ventilators, 
they might not function reliably and that 
vaccine cold chains are not solid. Deliver-
ing a vaccine to people living in remote 
areas will increase the energy demand for 
refrigeration, transportation, and health 
and storage facilities. Different renewa-
ble energy solutions, such as solar mi-
cro-grids, could be cost-effective ways to 
complement current electricity sources 
and to improve reliability. The African 
Union Commission, for instance, agreed 
to work with the International Renewa-
ble Energy Agency to advance renewable 
energy solutions in Africa’s response to 
COVID-19. 
Most significantly, the pandemic has 
affected mobility within Africa and be-
tween Africa and the rest of the world. 
Closed borders and travel bans have been 
imposed in over 40 countries, hamper-
ing the movement of people and goods, 
formal and informal economies and the 
transport sector as a whole. Responses to 
the pandemic have been nation-centric, 
challenging multilateralism and globali-
sation. 
The crisis, however, can also be an im-
petus for the geographic diversification 
of global manufacturing, wherein African 
countries could seize the opportunity to 
diversify their economies. The drop in 
global oil prices could also incentivise 
the transformation towards low-carbon 
economies. This would require significant 
investments into connectivity – improved 
logistics, reliable access to electricity, 
investing in skills development and em-
bracing digital technology. 
Unfortunately, COVID-19 will change 
Africa’s finance landscape. Many large in-
frastructure projects by China and other 
partners are expected to be delayed or 
even cancelled. Donor countries are likely 
to cut their foreign aid budgets due to 
heavily increased national spending. Af-
rica’s own resources have to tackle the 
health challenges related to COVID-19. 
Even though G-20 countries, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank have agreed to suspend debt repay-
ments until the end of year 2020, Afri-
can countries will need more resources to 
counter the current health and economic 
crisis and to turn it into opportunities 
that will benefit Africans. This requires 
political will, enabling policies and reg-
ulation, and in addition to public funds, 
considerable amounts of private sector 
investment. 
Despite the pandemic, Africa, jointly 
with its partners, has to quickly get back 
on track to improve Africa’s connectivity 
in a sustainable and equitable manner. 
It is only through improved connectivity 
that the pandemic can bring out opportu-
nities for Africans and the consequences 
of any future pandemic can be lighter. 
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